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This thesis develops a Semi-Markov reliability model for the
Synergistically .Integrated Reliability (SIR) computer architecture. The SIR
architecture is an advanced hybrid redundancy scheme that combines several
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source congruent data interchange. The architecture is designed to support
active control systems in the aircraft avionics industry as well as the bus
controller requirements for the Dispersed Sensor Processor Mesh (D5PM)
system for ultra-reliable computer communications. The paper also
develops high level algorithms for fault detection, location, and
configuration management within the SIR system.
The reliability model integrates the hardware design, the hybrid
redundancy philosophy, and the operating constraints of an active control
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I. INTRODUCTION
The role that computers play in controlling complex systems has
'increased dramatically with the advent of low cost microcomputers.
Research into fault tolerant computing has also intensified due to the
increased cost benefits available when microprocessors are used as
redundant system elements.
The combination of fault tolerance and complex system control in a
microprocessor based system has made it possible to create cost effective,
real time control systems for use in systems in which a failure could have
life threatening results. Real time control systems allow design of complex
systems at, or near, instability points. Designs of this type offer important
economic and performance gains, but there is little tolerance available to
account for fluctuations in the operational environment.
Advanced avionics is a category of_applications where these concepts
can be used. Advanced avionics incompasses the application of real time
active control technology to govern a variety of in-flight maneuvers that
are designed to enhance cost and performance measures of airplanes.
An example using these concepts is the digital fly-by-wire program
(DFBW) being researched at the NASA Ames Research Center, Dryden Flight
Research Facility. This program uses an F-8 aircraft that is modified to use
active controls so that the flight of the airplane can be controlled by a
digital computer. The airframe's flight status is updated every 20 ms by a
set of sensors with the information being supplied to a computer. The
computer analyses the flight data and instructs a set of servo mechanisms
to modify the flight pattern to conform to a given set of flight laws. The
airframe is designed to be statically stable so the maximum bounds on the
length of a control cycle is on theorder of 200 ms. The ability of the flight
laws the handle possible flight situations is suspect if the upper bound of
the control cycle is exceeded. [Refs. 1,2,3]
Another program that is being studied at the Dryden Research Facility
uses an X-29 ain'rame modified to reduce the static stability margin
required to fly the aircraft effectively. The avionics control package
designed to provide adequate flight control of the aircraft must react
within a control cycle that is on the order of 20 to 30 ms in duration.
Uncontrolled flight has the possibility of producing oscillatory airframe
behavior with the amplitude of the oscillation doubling every 100 ms.
Failure to control instability of this type results in the breakup of the
aircraft within a very small time period. IRefs. 1 ,2,3]
The benefits of design with close environment tolerances are very real
for the aircraft industry. Active control technology applied to the avionics
industry is a field that uses control systems to supply inputs to the
effector mechanisms that control the behavior of aircraft flight
(independant of specific pilot direction) . Estimations on performance
increases made possible by using active controls in statically instable
designs vary with the design choices made and the area where enhancement
is desired Boeing Aircraft, in a study for the U.S. Air Force, concluded that
25% fuel savings ^re possible Boeing also projected a possible 15/
increase in payload or a 7% increase in aircraft range for a 5ST aircraft
[Ref. 2.pp. 13]. These figures certainly indicate that implementation of
active controls is desirable if the control system can reliably maintain a
reasonable margin of operational safety. [Ref. 1]
Aircraft safety is an intensively regulated endeavor. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) currently requires reliability figures on
aircraft in the range of 10"^ catastrophic failures per flight hour for
flights with duration of up to 10 hours. Obviously, this reliability
requirement would be applied to aircraft designed to the above
specifications.
Achieving a system reliability of this magnitude is no trivial task. The
system reliability depends on more than the computer itself. The reliability
of a series of components degrades as the product of the component
reliabilities, even using identical components as is shown in Figure 1-1. In
order to meet the FAA requirements for system reliability, the system
components must all be ultra reliable. The components of such a system are
depicted in Figure 1-2.
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Figure 1-2 Ultra Reliable
Computer Control System
A great deal of research on this method of achieving system reliability
has already been accomplished. Of concern to this thesis is work conducted
at NASA's Dryden Flight Research Facility on the Dispersed Sensor Processor
Mesh (DSPM) [Refs. 1,4,5] and current research at the Naval Postgraduate
School (NP5) on fault tolerant computers [Refs. 6,7]. The DSPM is an ultra
reliable communications network that is to be used in connecting ultra
reliable sensor/effector sets with an ultra reliable computer. The D5MP,
based on work by Smith [Ref. 8], is an external communications network
that monitors and controls the buses providing data to and from the ultra
reliable computer and the sensor/effector sets [Refs. 1,4,5].
The current research being conducted by Dr. Abbott at NP5 concerns itself
with the computer portion of the ultra reliable system. A proposed
architecture to satisfy the high reliability requirements is the
Synergistically Integrated Reliability (SIR) architecture [Ref. 6]. A
hardware design implementing this architecture was recently created at
NPS by Captain Virgil Spuriock, US Army [Ref. 71.
The SIR architecture is an advanced hybrid redundancy scheme that
combines several of the most current reliability techniques to acheive
hardware and software reliability. These methods include hybrid
redundancy, N-version programming, and source congruent data interchanges
[Refs. 6,9], The basic architecture is displayed in Figure 1-3. Note that
there is no single component that directs the actions of the redundant set of
processors. Each active processor is totally independant, makes its own

















N-version programming, source congruency algorithms for data supplied
to the SIR system, and the lack of a system, control point force added
complexities in both the hardware implementation and the software that
controls task flow in the system. A more thorough discussion of the
implications of these techniques on the architecture implementations will
be made in Chapters II and V.
The purpose of the SIR architecture is to tolerate a number of faults
while still providing results that are judged to be correct within a defined
range of confidence. The triple modular redundancy (TMR) model, on which
hybrid redundancy is based, specifically judges that a minimum acceptable
confidence level can only be. obtained when at least two communicating
components (processors) agree on the result of a test applied to system
data values. The confidence level of correct system operation increases as
more components can be used in the verification process. Ideally, a
configuration control algorithm will modify the system configuration to one
that provides the optimum confidence in system output given the occurance
of one, or a series, of specific faults.
Modeling the reliability of such a system, or the Mean Time To Failure
(MTTR) for the system taken as a whole, is of course very dependant on the
reliability of the components of the system as well as the ability of the
system to correctly identify both the occurrence of a fault and its precise
location within the present system configuration. The system reliability is
thus directly dependant on not only the component hardware reliabilities,
but also on an operating protocol that includes a system of fault tests and a
system of reconfiguration algorithms. The configuration control algorithm
is one of a number of algorithms that will detect, locate, and configure
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around system faults. The group of algorithms, taken as a whole, will be
referred to as operating protocols thoughout the remainder of this paper.
Additional complications are created by the real time nature of the
control problem that is to be solved by the SIR computer system. All
decisions on correct data values must be made within the context of a 20 to
30 ms control cycle. This implies that any fault detection tests or system
configuration management tasks must also conform to this stringent
operational cycle.
The set of system configurations consisting of all possible combinations
of system components in either good or faulty states is referred to as the
set of system states. The size of the set of system states is 2 n
,
where
there are n components in the system each with two states, good or faulty.
The subset of all system states that must be controlled by the redundancy
management software must be small enough to allow operation within the
control window.
This thesis is concerned with developing a reliability model for the SIR
architecture that is appropriate to the environment in which it is to
operate. A high level specification will be generated for the algorithms
that performs fault detection, location, and configuration management
tasks. A secondary goal of the thesis is to analyze the model with a
semi-Markov analysis tool that was developed at NASA, Langley by Butler
based on work by White and Lee [Refs. 10,1 1,12]. A modification of this
program to provide a graphical, event driven, user interface and allow it to
operate on an IBM PC-AT microcomputer is being developed as a thesis at
NP5 by Major John Bordeaux, U5MC. The reliability model generated by this
thesis will serve as a test vehicle for the program conversion.
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II. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE SIR NODE DESIGN
The hardware of the individual SIR computer nodes must satisfy two
equally important design constraints. The nodes must be as simple as
possible while still meeting the computational requirements of the problem
to be solved. The nodes must also operate with sufficient speed to complete
the requisite calculations as well as complete any algorithms that detect
errors and determine the correct course of action subsequent to error
detection. An additional restraint on the node design is the requirement for
the hardware to support N-version programming.
The SIR architecture is based on a variation of basic hybrid redundancy.
Basic hybrid redundancy, shown in Figure 2-1, is an organizational scheme
proposed by Siewiorek [Ref. 13] that achieves increased reliability by using
redundant processors and a voting procedure to decide on a correct answer.
Basic hybrid redundancy utilizes three on-line computer nodes to
determine the correct system output value, with the remaining computers
being either spare or failed. The rotary multiplexer controls which of the
five computers are connected to the voter. The voter performs a bit by bit
comparison of the three data streams from the active computer nodes. The
correct result is sent to the external interface. The voter rejects any
active node values that do not match the other two on-line nodes. A status
of the vote is returned to the rotary multiplexer for use in selecting which















Figure 2-1 Basic Hybrid Redundancy
The N-version concept in software reliability was proposed by Chen and
Avizienis [Ref. 14] and is similar to the basic hybrid redundancy technique
for hardware. In this case, multiple versions of a computational function
are written to the same software specification. The versions may be
written in different languages or compiled with different compilers, but the
effect proposed is to eliminate a class of software errors that are data
driven. This theory states that it is unlikely that the same data driven
programming error will surface in all of the programs in exactly the same
way. Of course this does not provide proof against design faults but the
process could be extended to the software specification also.
N-version programming imposes several constraints on the hybrid
redundancy scheme for increased hardware reliability. The different
software versions of the function being implemented will behave
differently with respect to the roundoff and truncation errors that are
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inherent in digital computers. This will cause slight variations in the
values produced by these routines. Slight variations are quite acceptable if
the variations remain within some preset tolerance. If this small expected
difference in values is to be tolerated then the voter in the hybrid
redundancy scheme cannot be based on an identical match of data values.
There will also be some small differences in the time when specific
values are made available to the voters of the three active processors. This
variation is due to the differences in the algorithms and the language
efficiencies for different N-version programs that generate the data that
will be tested by the vote process. Some method and the hardware to
support it must be available to synchronize these time skewed values prior
to the vote process.
The basic hybrid redundancy system requires lock step sychronization
and performs a bit by bit identity comparison on the data being voted. These
requirements of basic hybrid redundancy do not support N-version
programming.
Regardless of the redundancy and fault tolerant strategy utilized in a
fault tolerant system, all fault tolerant systems contain sections, called
hardcores, that must work for the system to work. The voter and the rotary
multiplexer form a hardcore for the basic hybrid redundancy scheme. The
hardcore represents a single point of failure that could result in system
catastrophic failure. The voter can vote the wrong computer out; the rotary
multiplexer can select the wrong computer node for the voter.
The SIR architecture differs from basic hybrid redundancy in order to
reduce the hardcore problems mentioned above. The system still relies on a
triad of active computers for detection of error conditions and for deciding
15
the correct value in the presence of an error. A block diagram depicting the






















Each of the computer nodes in the SIR system contains a voter and a
rotary multiplexer. This allows a great deal more flexibility in
configuration management. The strategy also removes the voter and
multiplexer from hardcore status. The system can tolerate faults not only
in the host computers, but also in a multiplexer or voter and still continue
to operate with a high degree of confidence. Recall that the minimum
confidence level requirement of the system is two correctly operational
host computers and a communications link between them.
The design of the voter is another major difference in the basic hybrid
redundancy scheme and the SIR architecture. SIR meets the requirements of
16
N-version programming and the source congruency algorithms (discussed in
Chapter V) by using a mid value voter. The mid value voter concept
performs a bit by bit comparison of 3 values and returns those same values
sorted in value order (integer values). The mid value of this data triple is
taken to be the most correct; it is also the value that will be supplied to the
host computer for further processing or communication with SIR'S external
interface (DSPM). In addition, the state of the voter process is given. The
voter status register contains a maximum or minimum indication. If there
is no minimum indication then the two smallest values are equal. If there is
no maximum indication then the two largest values are equal. If neither
indication is given then all three values are equal. The price paid by this
increase in functionality is in increased complexity of the voters.
Complexity increases equate to decreases in component reliability as will
be discussed in section A of this chapter.
The SIR interstage is designed to control the data exchange process
between the voter and its sources of data. It is a rather complicated affair
because each node is designed to be completely hardware independant of the
remaining SIR nodes. The independant clocks used in the SIR nodes are set
to operate at the same rate, but there will obviously be some skew between
them. To overcome this skew problem, data transfers between nodes
require each node to send both data and a clock signal to the remaining
interconnected nodes in the SIR system.
A multiple clocking scheme is used in the interstage. Shift registers,
controlled by the external node clock signals, are used to interface external
data to the remainder of the interstage which is controlled by the host clock
signal. A block diagram of the interstage is shown in Figure 2-3.
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The externally controlled shift registers (indicated in Figure 2-3 by
primes) are interfaced with the internally controlled shift registers
(unprimed) through a windowing process based on an expected time margin.
The internally controlled registers load the values contained in the
externally controlled registers at the completion of a count performed by
the watchdog timer (WDT). An indication of receipt of a complete data word
is obtained by using modulo 32 counters on the incoming external clock
signals. A bit in the slave status register is set when the the proper count
is reached and the clock pulses being relayed to the primed registers are
terminated. The WDT controls a bit in the slave status register in a like
manner.
The rotary multiplexer in the SIR node performs in much the same
manner as that proposed by Siewiorek. The rotary multiplexer proposed by
Siewiorek implements a particular redundancy management algorithm in
hardware as a portion of the design. The SIR architecture performs
redundancy management within the host computer nodes. The complexity of
the multiplexer is reduced in the SIR concept by performing the connection
decision process in the host processor.
The bidirectional nature of the SIR multiplexer is a complexity factor
that offsets this advantage somewhat. The design shown in the figure
shows only the data communications switch; an identical circuit is
necessary to handle the clock signals. The SIR concept also enables a
greater flexibility in the decision process. The basic hybrid redundancy
scheme imposes a set algorithm in the hardwired logic of the multiplexer.
The SIR multiplexer is simply a switching network controlled by a set of























































Figure 2-3 Sin Interstage end NS32016-1G CPU
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independent of the algorithm that decides how it is set, so any algorithm
could be used. Figure 2-4 shows the rotary multiplexer circuit for the case
of a 6 node SIR architecture.
The rotary multiplexer is basically a 5 x 2 full duplex switch. The
controls that determine which 2 of the 5 external processors are connected
to the host interstage are loaded into the flip flops that interface with the
host computer (shown in Figure 2-4 as boxes). Any 2 path combination of
connections between the two rotary multiplexer interfaces are possible by
loading appropiate values into the host controlled flip flop register.
Due to the hardware scheme described above, the SIR nodes do not
require lock step synchronization in order for correct operation to t3ke
place. Not only can each node can have a unique clock associated with it,
but the hardware also supports the design constraints imposed by N-version
programming. The system can be said to be loosely coupled, with the degree
of coupling being determined by the window size that the WDT imposes on
the internode communication within the SIR system (which is variable by an
instruction supplied by the host). In practice, the coupling will be
comparatively tight due to the constraints of the application problem and
the method of detecting faults.
Now that the design of the SIR node has been developed, a systematic
reliability analysis of the node design must be performed. Section II A
describes the MIL-HDBK-217B reliability model. Section II B partitions the
circuitry into appropriate subdivisions that share similiar reliability
characteristics. The subdivisions will form the system components that
will be used in the system reliability model. The MIL-HNBK-21 7B reliability


















































Figure 2-4 SIR Rotary Mumpleuer
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A. COMPONENT RELIABILITY MODEL
A component fault model for circuit boards composed primarily of
integrated chips has been developed by the US Department of Defense. This
model is based on exhaustive testing, performed at Rome Air Force Base, NY,
on a variety of chips from diverse manufacturers. The conditions of the
tests were varied to account for expected environmental conditions in
which the circuit boards may operate, as well as the complexity of the
circuits that are implemented on the actual chips. [Ref. 15]
This model, designated as MIL-HDBK-217B, was published in 1976 and
covers several integrated circuit technologies including TTL, M05, 3nd ECL.
The model predicts a printed circuit failure rate which is based on an
exponential fault probability distribution for monolithic bipolar and MOS
circuits and has a form shown below:
X = 7tj_7tQ(C jitj + C27tE)7tp (failures/million hours)
Experience during the testing process has shown that 90% or more of the
faults that occur in printed circuit boards are due to integrated chips. The
effects of the printed board itself and such components as resistors and
capacitors on board reliability can then be neglected in design studies and
are not included in the model. Because an exponential distribution of faults
is assumed, the failure rate for an entire printed circuit board is the sum of
the failure rates for the chip components that are used in the circuit (a
series combination of system components).
22
The terms in the equation for failure rate each quantify the effects of
distinct environmental factors. The ttl term concerns the "learning curve-
that is expected with new fabrication processes. The value of the term is
set to 1 for established processes and 10 for new processes. ttq is a
function of the amount of screening the chip receives from the manufacturer
prior to its release. The model gives a range of values to this variable.
TTj and tt£ quantify the impact of environmental factors on the failure
rate. The former is a function of temperature while the latter is a function
of the mechanical stress (vibration and G forces) that can be expected in
environments of interest to the military (flight being one of them).
C
t
and C2 are factors that quantify the reliability effects of gate
complexity on a given chip (or the number of bits for memories). Tip is a
function of the number of pins in the chip package.
B. SIR 5Y5TEM COMPONENT RELIABILITIES
The determination of what portions of the overall SIR architecture are
classified as distinct components plays a central role in the algorithms that
will manage the redundancy of the computer architecture. The
classification scheme must follow a minimal set of rules if it is to be an
effective tool in the redundancy management design process as well as the
development of an accurate reliability model.
The first rule is that the grouping of circuitry into components should
follow functional relations. Division of a circuit into components that are
below the functional level should be avoided. This is a logical approach
because, for the redundancy management system to properly function, the
23
redundancy management system must be able to recognize the occurrence of
a fault with a set of tests of a reasonable size and complexity. There are a
number of techniques that are available for diagnosing faults within
circuitry, but it must be remembered that the SIP. hardware is designed to
operate in a real time control system. Tests, and decisions based on the
outcome of diagnostic tests, must conform to the limited duration control
cycle of the real time application. The tests are also performed by the
hardware itself, which increases the complexity of many of the diagnosis
techniques. The underlying goal of the architecture is to be ultra reliable,
this implies that the hardware and software must be as simple as possible
while providing the required functionality.
The second rule for classifying circuitry into components is that the
classification scheme should not create components that cannot be
effectively managed by the redundancy management system. The lack of
this second rule would needlessly complicate the reliability model and
perhaps lead to inaccuracies. The redundancy management algorithms would
also become more complex for no purpose.
The redundancy management algorithms perform 3 main tasks First, the
redundancy management algorithms perform a set of tests on the system in
order to identify any fault in the system of components. A test set must be
constructed so that faults in any of the components can be detected . Once
the fault is discovered, a fault location process is used that is composed of
another set of tests. Once the occurrence of a fault is detected and locat 1
the redundancy management routines must decide on a configuration for the
remaining good components (that satisfies the system requirement) in such
a way that the selected components interface with the overall system input
24
and output ports and eliminate the faulty component from effecting system
operation.
The design of the SIR node must be analyzed keeping the rules outlined
above in mind. Recalling the functional block diagrams shown in Figures 2-2
through 2-4, there are several sections of a node that can fail. These
functional failure modes are listed in Table 2-1. This grouping of circuits
within the overall design is selected so that obvious functionalities will
remain within a single component.
There are a variety of ways in which the host processor can fail. The
design of the host processor is presumed to be of a generic form for the
N532016 microprocessor. This component category includes the
microprocessor, its associated math coprocessor, the mass memory unit and
associated memory chips, and the necessary glue chips necessary for-
binding the components into a system.
This is quite a large component category. The justification for grouping
so large a set of subfunctions into one category is that the SIR architecture
proposes no reliability enhancement using redundancy within this
component. Some management of failures within this grouping of
components is possible without using component redundancy (such as a
memory chip), but these management techniques are based on software
detection and correction algorithms. Of course, the correct execution of
software is dependent on some portion of nonfaulty hardware, so the level
of confidence of these fault management techniques is questionable.
25
TABLE 2-1




a. False three way equality indication (1 case)
b. False two way equality indication (6 cases)
c. False three way inequality indication (1 case)
2. Timer failure
3. Controller failure
4 Slave Status Register Failure
C. Internet Communication Failure
1. All links fail (Rotary Mux and/or lnterStage(B'&C) failure)
2. Selected links fail (1-4)
3. Single Interstage channel fails (B' or C)
The groupings of components listed in the table within the
voter/interstage section of the node design are fairly obvious. There are of
course a large number of ways in which single gate level faults can occur
within any of these component categories. The result of any of these faults
is, however, the same; the component can no longer satisfy the functional
requirements for which it is designed.
There is again no redundancy within the voter and interstage sections of
the node design. Failure of any one of the components in these sections
prevents correct detection of vote errors or the passing of that detection
information to the connected host processor component. Recall that each of
the nodes is independant and bases it's decisions about fault detection,
location, and recovery on the agreement of at least two of the three
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connected processors. It is evident that any of the voter or interstage
failures within the host processor would make this detection process either
impossible or suspect. For this reason, the voter and interstage can be
classified with the processor as a single component.
The rotary multiplexer consists of a set of 2 paths (full duplex) that
connect the host node (processor and voter/interstage) to the external SIR
nodes. There are redundant paths inherent in the multiplexer design when
spares are included in the basic SIR starting configuration. (Without these
spares, there is no need of a rotary multiplexer).
The purpose of advanced hybrid redundancy is to allow the replacement
of faulty components with good spare components. This process is
physically achieved by managing the redundancy in the rotary multiplexer.
The control word that resides in the flip flop set in the multiplexer is
changed so that a new path or set of two paths are selected that connect the
host with its external nodes. Failure of one of the paths not currently in use
is not detectable and does not degrade the confidence level of the decisions
currently being made within the host node even though the ability of the
node to recover from a detectable fault has been reduced. (This assumes
that the failed circuitry does not effect the remaining circuitry by
overloading the power supply or injecting noise into the system. The failure
of a path will be assumed to be independant from the rest of the circuit,
although this assumption may in fact not be true for all cases. The impact
of any fault dependance should manifest itself in the an increased rate of
failure for the remaining circuitry. Fault independance will be assumed in
the model developed in this paper.) The TMR confidence level requirement is
only that two connected nodes agree on state values. Therefore, on the
27
occurrence of a failure of one of the selected paths, a new path can be
established with another external node without an unacceptable degradation
in the confidence level. This of course presumes that the time interval
needed to establish the new path is small enough that the probability .of
failure of the remaining good path through the multiplexer is vanishingly
small.
The establishment of a good path is not solely dependent on one rotary
multiplexer path. The link between two SIR nodes is terminated in rotary
multiplexers at both ends of the link. The connection path between nodes
therefore consists of the paths through two sets of rotary multiplexers and
the physical connection between them. For the purposes of this thesis the
effects of the physical link between nodes, with respect to overall link
reliability, will be neglected (in line with the tenents of the
Ml L-HDBK-217B model).
Analysis of the circuit used in the rotary multiplexer shows that a
distinct subset of component gates are used in each of the paths through the
rotary multiplexer. The subset of gates varies between the input and output
paths through the multiplexer, with the larger subset controlling the input
leg. The subsets for both the output and input legs of a link are shown in
Figures 2-5 and 2-6 respectively.
The larger set of gate components in the input leg of the path through the
multiplexer is due to the 5 input OR gate. The OR gate does not isolate the
output of the path (into the interstage) from stuck-at-l faults that could
arise from the other input paths. This inability to isolate the effects of
faults in nonselected links causes a single p3th failure to propagate to one
of the interstage input registers (B" or C) and effectively causes a failure in
28
the interstage. The whole node is thus in a failed state and management of



















Figure 2-5 S3?* Notary Multipleuer



























Figure 2-6 Shi Botary Multiplexer
(Single Input Path Highlighted)
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Study of Figure 2-6 reveals that the critical components needed in the
isolation of failed paths are the AND gates feeding into the 5 input OR gate.
In order for the isolation to take place, the outputs of the nonselected AND
gates must be a logical 0. The occurrence of a logic at the output of the
AND gate is dependent on the correct operation of the gate as well as a
correct set of input values supplied to it.
The SIR architecture is based on a system of cold spares. That is, there
is a mechanism that controls the power being supplied to the nodes in the
system. The means of powering up a new node and depowering a node
determined as a failed node is controlled by the combination of the
remaining two active nodes. A single node is unable to affect the power
controlling mechanism therefore a single point of failure cannot disrupt the
power system. The circuit that performs this power control has not been
designed as yet so it will not be included in the probability model that is
being generated in this thesis. The implications of the mechanism to the
SIR architecture, however, will be included.
The result is that an unpowered spare presents a logic to its rotary
multiplexer outputs. This is fortunate in that the isolation of failed paths
now relies only on the correct functioning of the AND gates that feed the 5
input OR gate highlighted in Figure 2-6, as well as the 2 flip flops that
control the links to the remaining active nodes.
Effective management of the redundancy in the rotary multiplexer
requires that isolation of bad components be possible. Since there exists a
portion of the input path that cannot support this isolation, that portion
must be grouped with the rest of the node for both reliability calculation
and redundancy management purposes (the processor, voter, and interstage).
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Therefore, the 5 input OR gate, and the 5 AND gates that feed it, will be
considered a portion of the node. The AND gate that controls the loading of
the flip flops must also be classified as a portion of the node. The 2 flip
flops that control the inputs from the powered external nodes will be
classified with the link component.
A link component will consist of the output path as shown in Figure 2-5
and an additional 2 flip flops that contribute to the input path. Of course
the link is terminated on 2 ends so the component list must be doubled.
Each link must also carry the clock signal for use in controlling the
interstage B" and C registers so the component count must be doubled again
All remaining rotary multiplexer gates will be grouped together with the
host node for component reliability calculations.
Tables D6 through DIO of Reference 16 contain a breakout of integrated
chip failure rates calculated using pessimistic values for the parameters
contained in the M1L-HNBK-217B reliability model for printed circuit boards.
Tables 2-2 through 2-5 use the data in the referenced tables to calculate
the component and subcomponent failure rates of the SIR node. The gate
information for the listed chips was extracted from Reference 17 The
node's computer is assumed to consist of a N532016 microprocessor and
N532081 floating point coprocessor along with 64K of memory. The failure
rate information for the microprocessor and coprocessor was extracted
from References 18 and 19.
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TABLE 2-2




26 2 LSI 75 Quad D Flipf lops
12 1 LS74 Dual DFlipflops
- 4 27S291 2K x 8 Prom
6 2 LS04 Hex Inverters
4 ! LSI1 Quad3-lnput AND
1 1 LS30 8- Input NAND
2 1 LS20 Dual 4- Input NAND






26 4 LSI 75 Quad D Flipflops
6 2 L504 Hex Inverters
1 27 LS30 8-lnput NAND
2 14 L520 Dual 4- Input NAND







12 8 LS74 Dual D Flipf lops
4 LS30 2- Input AND
2 8 L520 Dual 2-input OR
TfiBLE 2-5
FAILURE RATE BY SUBCOMPONENTS
(IN FAILURES/ 106 HOURS)




Shift Registers (20 L5299) 17.8429
Buffers (4 LS245) 1.2469
Slave Status Register (2 LSI 25) 0.2917
Watch Dog Timer (4 LSI 63) 2. 1 706
Modulo 32 Counters (2 L5 1 6 1
)
0.9878








B. Link Total 3.4519
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III. System Environment
Before developing the redundancy manangement protocol' and a system
reliability model, a more complete understanding of the control problem
being solved by the SIR architecture is necessary.
Recall that the design of the airframe is such that stability has been
reduced to a marginal value. The airplane design allows conditions (a
center of gravity aft of center of lift for pitch) that cause the airframe to
cross the line between stable and instable operation. Catastrophic
instability is avoided by using real time avionic controls to correct the
flight pattern before the instability increases to a level that cannot be
corrected.
The environment in which the aircraft is flying is of course a major
factor in the rate of instability increase. NASA, Ames, has performed tests
on airframe stability under a variety of conditions. The analysis showed
that the X-29 aircraft, modified to the conditions described in Chapter I,
would display an oscillatory instability pattern with the amplitude doubling
every 100 rns for environments adverse to the designed airframe
characteristics. Breakup of the airframe may occur when the avionics
controls are not used to reduce the stress being applied to the aircraft by
that adverse environment.
A. DSPM AND THE CONTROL PROBLEM
A 20 ms control cycle is considered by many to be the acceptable
frequency of applied controls [Refs. 1,2,20,21]. The cycle consists of
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gathering flight state information from a set of sensors distributed about
the airframe, performing a computation on the sensory data to determine
the action necessary to bring the airframe within acceptable tolerances of
airframe stress, and the distribution of commands to a set of effector
servos that control the pattern of flight. A longer interval between receipt
of effector commands is possible while still being able to recover stable
flight operation but an upward bound of 200 ms is predicted for the
maximum time that the F-8 can sustain a fault under critical flight
conditions [Ref.. 21].
The solution must meet the reliability requirements of both NASA and
the FAA. The 10"^ per flight hour failure rate over a 10 hour mission time
is quite stringent. This stringent reliability requirement makes the problem
significantly more difficult and means the reliability cannot be met by an ad
hoc patch work but requires a systems approach to reliability.
The avionics control cycle consists of gathering data (via sensors),
performing calculations (via a computer), and exercising control operations
(via effectors). A portion of the cycle that is not explicitly stated in this
cycle is the communication of data to and from the computer (combining the
sensors and effectors into one category). The system consists of three
major components (as was shown in Figure 1-2).
The ultra reliability of each of the major components of the system is
achieved through the use of redundancy. A basic description of hybrid
redundancy was given in Chapter II. An extension of this process can be
applied to the sensor/effector component resulting in three sources of
equivalent data that are made available to the computational element. A
voting scheme is used at the effectors to determine the correct signal in a
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manner similar to the approach proposed by Siewiorek [Refs. 1,13]. A
midvalue vote process is not needed because further calculations are not
necessary at the effector. The simpler, and therefore more reliable, hybrid
redundancy hardware is sufficient.
Not only is the communication path a possible source of data corruption,
for sensory data as well as effector commands, but the link may also be
physically damaged. A simple approach for achieving the communications
element of the overall control system is to provide a direct connection
between the computational element and the sensor/effector nodes. This is
not desirable because one component failure (the bus) could destroy the
whole control system.
A bus scheme such as the one shown in Figure 3-1 uses redundancy to
increase the reliability of the communications paths. While this approach is
the commonly accepted method, it has some drawbacks. The concept is
based on redundant components and not adaptability to possible system
states. A single failure on any of the terminals on a bus can cause the
entire bus to fail.
An example is the case of a babbling node. In this case the whole bus
effectively fails because bus control is destroyed. It is even possible for a
failure of a single remote terminal to render the entire redundant bus
system useless. [Ref. 1]
The dispersed sensor processor mesh (DSPM) is a system of
communications links that is designed to overcome the drawbacks of
redundant bus schemes while avoiding the hardware overkill that is implied
in a fully connected communication system. The system is discussed in
length by Dr Abbott in Ref. 1 , so a detailed description of the DSPM system
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will not be given in this paper. An overview of the system is necessary
however, because it impacts the reliability model that will be generated for












ure 3-1 Conventional Approach to
RedundantCommunications
A typical DSPH network is shown in Figure 3-2. The essence of the
reliability enhancement achieved by this system lies in two major system
characteristics. First, not all links in the system are in use. Active links,
displayed in the figure as solid lines, carry actual information. The links
displayed with dotted lines are inactive and carry no information. The
active links in the DSPM network form a set of tree structures that
originate at the bus controller and grow out to the furtherest link in the
system of nodes. Fach of the nodes in the system control one or more
sensors or effectors and are distributed throughout the airframe.
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The second characteristic of the D5PM network is that network control
is centrally located in the bus controller. The bus controller manages the
network of links by three main algorithms; the growth, repair, and modify
algorithms.
The growth algorithm is a network initiation algorithm that determines
which links are used to form the trees shown in Figure 3-2. The growth
algorithm is a breadth first growth process. Note that each node of the
system has a number of links (full duplex). The nodes are directed by the
bus controller to identify one of its ports as an inbound port through which
the node will receive bus controller (BO commands and through which the
node will relay the BC commands through the other ports to the rest of the
tree. Each tree in the network has a different bus controller port as its
root. The direction of data flow and the state of each link in the network is
determined by the growth algorithm resident in the bus controller. A
necessary system property is that there are no closed loops in the network.
This is important to the algorithms that control the DSPM network. (See
Ref. 1 for details of why this is so.)
When a fault is detected by the system, the repair algorithm
circumvents the failed link or node by activating an inactive one to
reconfigure around the fault. There can be a very large number of system
configurations that generate an acceptable network structure given the
occurrence of a fault in the system. If the repair algorithm encounters a
second fault during the repair process, the links in the nodes are reset and
the growth algorithm is used again. This retreat to the growth algorithm
greatly decreases the complexity and processing requirements of the repair
algorithm and is acceptable so long as the growth algorithm is of sufficient
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speed that the control cycle can be completed within the bounds of safe
operation. (The growth algorithm must also have the means to accommodate
failed link/node states in the growth process, which it does.)
©-©-© M
Figure 3-2 Dispersed Sensor
Processing Mesh Bpproach
The DSPM modify algorithm is a method for discovering failures in
inactive links before they can become a critical factor in a repair or growth
process. Faults that occur in inactive links are not observable. The modify
algorithm makes these latent faults observable by periodically exchanging
the inactive links with their active counterparts while retaining the
requisite connections between the affected node sensor/effector
components. The algorithm is designed to be distributed over many control
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cycles. The process is continued at the- end of a number of control cycles
until all of the inactive links have been activated for some portion of the
current modify cycle. At the end of the modify cycle the process is begun
again. Detection of a "discovered" link fault will of course generate a repair
task.
The DSPti relies on the bus controller to make all network configuration
decisions. Network configuration management requires a significant
computational element and as such may be combined with the
computational element required for the overall control system. Of course
this requires that the SIR hardware and operating system software support
the additonal task of controlling a complex communication network. The
entire task cycle in the SIR computer must run within a 20 ms control cycle
under fault free conditions. The SIR system must also be able to correctly
respond to both internal as well as external faults within the upper bound of
the control cycle.
B. SYSTEM TASK STRUCTURE
The operating system that is to manage the SIR task cycle can be
implemented as an event driven real time operating system. The set of
tasks that must be scheduled is shown in Figure 3-3. These tasks are
scheduled as events by the operating system using a system of priorities to
determine the next event that is to be executed. There are other tasks that
the operating system must also schedule such as memory management and
I/O port control functions. These are not included in the set of tasks shown
in Figure 3-3 because they are standard tasks in general purpose operating
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systems and have no impact on the reliability model that will be generated























Figure 3-3 Operating System Task Structure
A base line scheduling structure is used to manage the tasks when the
system is in an error free state. Because the SIR system is designed with a
high reliability as a goal, it is expected that the majority of the control
cycles will fall into this task execution pattern. Figure 3-4 graphically
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displays the error free task execution flow as a continuous bar of tasks that
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Figure 3-4 System Task flow
There are of course errors that can be encountered due to hardware and
software faults as discussed in Chapter II. An error handling module is
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shown that controls the response to encountered errors. (The algorithms for
error detection and error state maintenence will be discussed in Chapter V.)
Upon encountering an error in the execution of any of the main loop tasks,
an error handling task is generated. The error handler is of a higher priority
than the main execution loop so control is passed to this module after
saving the necessary register set and temporary variables in the currently
executing module.
The error handler locates the error and generates a task or set of tasks
to respond to the error appropriately. The priorities of the error correction
tasks are adjusted for correct execution order. The error handler sets these
priorities based on the severity of the error. The execution control may in
fact be returned to the main loop routine that detected the error, with the
error correcting tasks scheduled for execution after completion of the
control cycle. In this case, the Modify task would not be implemented in the
current control cycle, but delayed until completion of the next control cycle.
As stated in Chapter II, the operating systems of the active SIR
computer nodes are completely independant. All of the software written for
the SIR computer must also be independant, or protocols must be designed to
distribute system information correctly among the processors. Each of the
SIR processor nodes contains one of the BC ports into the DSPM network (as
described in Chapter II]. Because the DSPM management algorithms depend
on the absense of any closed loops in the subtree structures (within a tree
or among the bus controller and any combination of trees), there is definite
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dependance among the software that resides in each of the SIR procesor
nodes.
The system information needed to manage the DSPM network consists of
a set of tables that describe the DSPM network state, which links are
active, inactive, or failed, and information on the tree structure that forms
the communications paths from the bus controller to the sensor/effector
nodes of the DSPM network. Each of the active SIR processors has
independant control over one of the trees, but state information must be
global among the processors if the DSPM algorithms are to function
properly.
It is fairly obvious that there must be a high degree of confidence in the
values of the state information that is passed between the SIR processor
nodes. The method in which this information is passed must provide a
degree of verification or any reliability models that describe the SIR
system will be incomplete and Inaccurate.
The programs that will implement the DSPM algorithms will be coded as
if the SIR system is a single processor computer. A mechanism that can be
used to control the actual three processor environment is a set of traps
embedded in the operating system. These traps treat the section of memory
that contains the DSPM states tables as a special memory category. When
an update operation is performed on data within this section of memory, the
trap routine communicates the update to the other active processors in the
SIR processor network. System state table congruence/ between the
processors is assured by this trap system.
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IV. SYSTEM RELIABILITY
The model for the complete sensor/DSPM/SIR system is quite complex
and is best approached as a series of models, one for each major subsystem.
The reliability of the DSPM system has been estimated as 10~ 12 system
failures per flight hour during a 10 hour flight [Ref. !]. Achieving a similiar
reliability figure is a goal of the SIR architecture.
There are several levels that can be viewed in developing a reliability
model for the SIR system. The major levels are the component reliability
model and a systems reliability model for calculating the effect of the
components taken as a system. The reliability model for the components in
the system has been developed in Chapter II and a set of component
reliabilities have been generated from this component level model.
The SIR processor network is based on hybrid redundancy, which itself is
based on a TMR operating environment. The purpose of the TMR model and its
supporting architecture is to tolerate a number of faults while still
providing results that are judged to be correct within a defined range of
confidence. The TMR model specifically judges that a minimum acceptable
confidence level can only be obtained when at least two communicating
components (processors) agree on the result of a test applied to system
data values. The confidence level of correct system operation increases as
more components can be used in the verification process. Ideally, the
configuration control software will modify the system configuration to one
that provides the optimum confidence in system output given the occurrence
of one or more specific faults. Figure 4-1 graphically shows the basic TMR
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system configuration from a logical component level. The components of
the system that are subject* to faults (and fault management) are the








Figure 4-1 Basic TMH System
Modeling the reliability of the basic TMR system requires the definition
of all possible system states where the minimum configuration exists, "re-
model also requires a specification of the set of operating procedure; :
are necessary to manage all of the possible "good" states. These operating
procedures must include a test set for each good system state such that
additional faults can be detected and the model can progress to another good
state. Each good system state can require a unique operational pre :e
and test set since the combination of good components in the system will
vary with fault occurrences
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Effort has been expended to determine how the reliability of the system
increases as spares are added to the basic TMR system [Refs. 5,22,23}. In
order to achieve greater system reliability the spares are assumed to be in
an unpowered state. A model for predicting the reliability of unpowered
spares is very difficult to develop. The difficulty arises due to being unable
to test the component in an unpowered state. The process of powering up
the component most likely introduces more stress on the component than
the entire time the component is in the unpowered state. As a result,
periodically activating a major component like a computer node for fault
testing is probably not reasonable. This thesis will not concern itself with
the subtleties of modeling the unpowered state. An assumption will oe
made that the component reliabilities of the unpowered components is a
single order of magnitude less than that of the components in the powered
state.
The goal of the system as defined above is two fold. First, and most
important, the goal is the operation of the system in the presence of a
number of faults. A second goal is operation in the configuration giving the
most confidence in the results being generated by the system.
What are the implications when spares are introduced to the basic TMR
system'?' The standard system operation remains the same: three active
processors compare outputs to determine correct operation. The difference
in reliability is that the number of system links grows in a nonlinear
fashion as spares are added to the system ( n(n- I )/2 where n is the number
of nodes in the system).
Nonlinear growth in the number of system links implies that the growth
of system states is also non linear. Each of the system components can be
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modeled as being in one of two states - functional or nonfunctional. This is
a simplification since there is also the possibility of improper component
functioning, but that will be ignored for the present. The number of states
possible given the starting configurations, is then 2n
,
where n is the number
of system components. An indication of the rate of growth in system states
is evident in Table 4-1. A systematic method is needed to identify the set
of states necessary for a valid reliability model and determination of the
necessary operating protocols and test sets.
TABLE 4-1
STATE PROGRESSION
AS SPARES ARE ADDED TO BASIC TMR
Configuration Proces<5ors Links States
Basic TMR 3 3 2 6 = 64
TMR 1 Spare 4 6 2 10 = 1024
TMR * 2 Spares 5 10 7 15 = 32,768
TMR + 3 Spares 6 15 ? 21 = 2,097,15
System operation always occurs with an active set of processors of two
or three. This property of sytern operation allows the development of an
incremental system reliability model for the 5!R processor network nj
basic mode] covers the three processor (basic TMR) case Each of !
incremented models, corresponding to the addition of spares to the system,
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will degenerate to the basic TMR case after some combination of component
faults in the overall system.
Since there is no single control point in the system being modeled, the
total number of possible system states is not needed to either calculate the
number of distinct operating protocols required or to calculate the
reliability of the system. Clearly, some aggregation of states into like
configurations is possible (differing only by label changes of the nodes and
appropiate connecting links).
A. THE SEMI -MARKOV MODEL
The Markov process model is a powerful tool for analyzing complex
probabilistic systems. The central concepts of such models are states and
state transitions. The states of a system have already been defined, but it
should be pointed out that each state of the system represents all that must
be known to describe the system at any instant. A second key concept in
this model is the state transition. As time passes and faults are
introduced, the system passes from state to state. These changes of state
are called state transitions. Discrete-time models require all of the
transitions to occur at fixed intervals and assign probabilities to each
possible transition. For reliability models, the transitions represent failure
occurrences and configuration functions (or repair functions for other than
real time applications). [Ref. 16]
The basic assumption of Markov models is that the probability of a given
state transition depends only on the current state. The length of time spent
in a state does not influence the probability distribution of the next state or
the distribution of time remaining in the present state. This assumption is
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rather strong but it fits naturally with the assumption that failure rates
are constant. The constant failure rate assumption applies to the
operational phase of component operation and results in an exponential
distribution of arrival times of failures. The Weibull distribution, based on
non-constant failure rates, apply to the burn in and wear out phases of
component operation. The model developed in this paper will apply to the
operational phase.
The reliability model that will be developed for the SIR computer system
does not require the entire set of system states. There are several cases
where the system can catastrophically failed before the system states are
exhausted by the arrival of faults. These failure conditions arise due to the
confidence requirements of TMR systems. For example, failure of two of the
active processor nodes without a correcting reconfiguration is a
catastrophic condition, even if there are several spares in the system that
are in a non-failed state. System failure states are referred to as death
states; no transitions from death states are possible.
The probability of entering a death state is precisely what is needed to
determine the reliability of the system. The calculation of the probability
of entering the death state of a semi-Markov model requires the solution of
a set of coupled differential equations. The large disparity between rates
of fault arrivals and the rate of recovery (based on reconfiguration) usually
leads to numerically stiff differential equations. This problem along with
the high computational cost of solving large state space problems has led to
the use of tools such as CARE III and HARP, and ARIES [Refs. 10,16]
A tool that was recently developed at NASA, Langley is the Semi-Markov
Unreliability Range Evaluator (SURE) [Ref. 10]. The program is based on a
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mathematical theorem developed by White [Ref. 11] that enables efficient
computation of the death state probabilities. The technique provides a
means of bounding the probability of entering a death state of a
semi-Markov model using simple model parameters such as the means and
variances of the state transitions. The advantage of the SURE technique is
that the bounds are algebraic in form and thus computationally efficient.
Because of this computational simplicity, very large models can be analyzed
by the program.
The modeling of highly reliable fault tolerant systems generally exhibits
both slow and fast processes with respect to mission time. When these
systems are modeled stochastically, some state transitions are many orders
of magnitude faster than others. The slower transitions correspond to the
arrival of faults in the system while the faster transitions represent the
system response to the fault. Fault arrivals are modeled as exponentially
distributed and are therefore time invarient with respect to the length of
time that the system resides in a specific state. System recovery
transitions are generally not exponentially distributed and therefore the
rates are time dependent. In order to preserve the semi-Markov nature of
the system, the time since entering the current state is used to calculate
the system recovery time probability. Because the TMR system uses three
way voting to mask a fault, there is a race between system recovery and the
occurrence of another fault.
The state and state transition basis of the semi-Markov model is
represented very nicely by a directed graph. An example of a graph
representation of a Markov process is shown in Figure 4-2. The states are
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represented by the labeled nodes in the figure while the state transitions
are represented by the directed arcs.





Figure 4-2 Graphical Representation
of a Semi-Markou Model
The horizontal arcs correspond to the slow transitions of fault arrivals.
These occur with exponential rate X, with the coefficients of X
representing the number of components that can fail. Vertical arcs
represent fast transitions that correspond to system recovery.
White's theorem is based on a graphical analysis of a semi-Markov model.
The theorem calculates the bounds on the probability of traversing a
specific path within a specific time. Applying the theorem to all of the
possible paths of the model results in determination of the probability of
the system reaching any death states bounded by a narrow interval. [Ref. 24]
The SURE program will be used as a tool for determining the reliability
of the SIR system model. The model developed in this thesis will conform
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to the graphical representation conventions that are described for Figure
4-2. See References 10,1 1, and 24 for a more detailed discussion of White's
theorem.
B. THE SINGLE FAULT ARRIVAL ASSUMPTION
The SIR system of processors performs a self diagnosis to detect and
locate faults within the active processor set. The reliability model of such
a system can assume a variety of fault arrival conditions. The level of
confidence in fault detection and correction in a discrete system is
dependent on the number of faults that can arrive during one interval. The
confidence level will decrease as the number of simultaneous component
faults increases.
The reasoning behind this property is straight forward. The detection of
a fault in the system becomes increasingly more difficult and the
algorithms to perform this detection becomes more complex. An example
illustrates the point nicely. Suppose that a host processor (Processor A) in
the basic TMR system receives a vote after a data exchange which indicates
an unacceptable inequality condition on one of the external active SIR
processor nodes (Processor B). An acceptable conclusion could be that the
link connecting nodes A and B was corrupted by noise, or that processor node
B is faulty. But suppose that there is also the possibility that the Processor
A*s voter could have malfunctioned. This poses a problem to the operating
protocol in Processor A. If the processor assumes that the fault was due to
the voter, it will take itself out of service. If there is the possibility that
the voter is malfunctioning, then any tests received by processor A by way
of its voter is also suspect. If the fault actually occurred in Processor B
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then two of the three processors are effectively in a faulty state, and the
system collapses.
The best case for system confidence is obviously for there to be only one
fault occurrence during any one test cycle. Reliability based on the arrival
of faults for single components is modeled as a exponentially distributed
probability function and has the form shown in equation 4-1.
R = e~xt , (4-1)
where
R is the reliability
X is the component failure rate
t is the time interval since the last known
good state was observed.
The reliability of the TMR system is a multiplicative combination of the
reliabilities of the TMR components. An equation for reliability for a fully
operational TMR system is given in equation 4-2,








R5 is the system reliability,
Rp is the reliability of a single processor node
Rj_ is the reliability of a single processor link
Because the processors and links used in the TMR system are identical,
there is no reason for a unique labeling system, hense the terms in equation
4-2. The equation is a statement of the probability of there being exactly
zero component faults in the TMR system during a specified interval. This
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is one of a set of probabilities that cover all of the possible component
fault states that the TMR system can be in during that interval. The
occurrence of multiple faults within a single component is not germaine to
the system reliability equation because a single fault is assumed to cause
the incorrect operation of the component.
Suppose that a hypothesis is made that states that there can only be a
single component fault during the test interval. The reliability figure
desired for the system is IO~'* system failures per hour during a 10 hour
flight. The probability of more than one component fault occurring during a
test cycle should be at least an order of magnitude greater than the desired
system reliability over the mission time. If it can be proven that this is the
case, then the assumption that only one component fault can occur within
one test cycle is valid. The operating protocols, given a single fault arrival
assumption, will then be a great deal less complex as will the reliability
model describing the SIR system.
The probability that there will be exactly one faulty component within
the test cycle is the summation of the probabilities that a unique component
will fail and the remaining components will not fail. In a system consisting
of six components this requires six probability terms. An equation for the
case of exactly one faulty component during a test interval is shown in
equation 4-3.











Pq(i) is the probability that i components will fail in time t
( 1 - RK ) is the probability that component k has 1 or more faults
56
The probability that two components will fail in the test interval is
calculated in a similiar manner. The number of terms in the equation will
be equal to the number of unique cases of components taken two at a time
from the set of system components. Equation 4-4 shows this relation.
P5(2)












Substituting the values for component reliabilities developed in Chapter
II into the equations for probability of faulty components during a test
interval leads to the probabilities shown in Table 4-2. A test for faults is
assumed to take place during every control cycle as depicted in Figure 3-4.
The test interval used in the fault probability equations is the maximum
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It is obvious that the probability of more than one component becoming
faulty during a single test interval is insignificant when compared to the
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overall reliability requirement for the system. The protocols and system
reliability models that are developed in this paper assume that the fault
arrivals are singular during a test interval.
V. THREE PROCESSOR CASE
This chapter will discuss the three processor case of the SIR
architecture. Expansions to the three processor case, are possible using
additional computer nodes as spares, however all of these cases will
effectively degenerate to some form of the three processor case by the
introduction of enough system component failures.
The operation of the SIR system is based on the TMR principle. System
spares are in a cold, nonpowered state and can only be activated by actions
taken by the other two active SIR processors in concert. These two system
characteristics cause the three processor case to be important to larger
systems with spares, even before the introduction of component failures.
The SIR architecture uses an active processor set consisting of three
processors; all the tests for fault detection and location and the decisions
based on the outcomes of these tests are made by the active three processor
set. The internode communication links do not require a rotary multiplexer
for the three processor case. The multiplexer hardware is, however, needed
for all cases that contain spares, so the links (using the standard link,
hardware discussed in Chapter II) will be included. The results will apply
to all cases regardless of the number of spares.
There are several issues that apply to the three processor case of the
SIR architecture. Each of these issues will be discussed in a separate
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section. Section A will discuss the operation of data congruency in the
three (good) processor case. Section B will develop a set of system states
that meets the TMR requirement for two connected, good processors This
set of system states will consist of acceptable "views" of a partially failed
system that can still be managed. Section C will develop a high level
communications protocol that is necessary for the data congruency
operations discussed in section A. The protocol will also address the fault
location process. Finally, section D will develop a semi-Markov model of
the three processor case based on aggregations of acceptable system states
discussed in section B.
A. DATA CONGRUENCY AND FAULT DETECTION
The SIR architecture was developed to meet a real time control problem
that has a specific cycle of events to process. The event cycle includes a
series of data words that must be exchanged reliably between the active
processors. These data words can be exchanged in two basic modes. The
first mode requires an exact match of the value that each of the three
active processors generate. This type of word will consists of system state
information as discussed in Chapter III (states of the DSPM system). A
seperate case where bit invarient data exchange is necessary, is in the
command words of the inter-SIR communications protocol discussed in
section D of this chapter. The test for equality of the triad of data words is
made at each of the active processors by their respective voter elements
The equality condition is observable to the host processor by viewing the
contents of the slave status register.
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A second category of data word communication is also required. The
sources of these words are the sensor inputs to the SIR system and the
output values generated by the flight law calculations in the separate active
processors (that are subsequently communicated by the DSPM to the
effector servos in the aircraft). There is a large probability that data of
this type will slightly vary in the low order bits as discussed in Chapter II.
There are bounds on the amount of variation acceptable in the data however.
Observability of the size of the variation between the minimum and
maximum values of the data triad is achieved by calculation in the node's
host processor. The preset bounds, with respect to the particular word
being voted, is applied to this calculated difference to determine whether
any of the values deviate unacceptably.
Both of these data transfer types will be used in each of the control
cycles that were discussed in Chapter III. The cross communication and
vote of these data words provide a comprehensive test of the active
components in the SIR system. The process of communication itself is a
test of the links that connect the active processors, each active processor's
internal components are thoroughly exercised during the execution of the
flight law modules.
Although exercising the functionality of a component is not in itself a
test for a fault, the verification process inherent in the voting process is
indeed a test for a component fault. So long as two of the three processors
agree on the outcome of a particular vote process, then the agreed upon
value can be taken as valid with the confidence level of the overall system
remaining at an acceptable level. (Of course a three way agreement
generates a higher level of confidence.)
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When an unacceptable comparison of the active processor generated data
values occurs, of either the varient or invarient type, an indication of a
component fault condition is established. The fault can be caused by quite a
number of faults internal to the offending node, for example the node"s
voter, floating point processor, or memory. The fault could also be caused
by the link connecting a pair of the active processors.
The fault that has been detected by the unacceptable data comparison can
be caused by either a permanent fault or a transient fault. Transient faults
have many causes such as excessive electrical noise in the aircraft
environment and marginal operation of some set of component circuits. The
effects of transient faults have a low probability of occurring over an
extended time so repeated the tests over a number of control cycles can
eliminate the possibility (with high probability) that the error is a
transient one. [Refs. 1,13]
There is an external system characteristic that can cause a fault
detectable by data disagreement. In the ideal case the data supplied by the
external sensors and transmitted over the DSPM system will arrive as a
data triad with one data word being supplied to each node. An unacceptable
variation in the values of these data words could be caused by faults in the
sensor set or the DSPM system. In either case, the SIR system would
generate a data disagreement detected fault. A preset test for correct
operation of the SIR system is required to isolate the fault within the SIR
system or within the external system when sensor data is being cross
linked and voted. If the fault is isolated to the external system (consisting
of the sensor set or the DSPM system) then this information is passed to
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DSPM redundancy management routines. (These routines will not be
considered in this paper.)
1. Simplex Data Transfer
Simplex data is propagated from one SIR node to the remaining two
active nodes by an algorithm designed to insure congruency in the data
between processors. Of course the transfer of simplex data must be made in
an invarient manner because only one copy of the data is made available to
the SIR system. Figure 5-1 displays a graphical representation of the
simplex data distribution algorithm. Data supplied to node A (either by
external input or a DSPM state table update as a result of a DSPM algorithm)
is loaded into each of its interstage registers. In the second phase of the
transfer, the interstage registers (B and C shown in Figure 2-3) transfer
their contents to the associated interstages of the remaining two active
nodes. The value in the home register (A in Figure 2-3) remains the same.
In the third stage each of the interstages loads the received data into
its register set complement. At this point all the interstage registers
contain the original data value. In the forth stage, the contents of the
interstages are again cross linked. At this point, each of the interstages
have a copy of the data received by each of the remaining interstages. The
interstages vote the data at this point. If the votes indicate a three way
equality (observable by there being no min or max indication in the slave
status register) then the data transfer is correct. A maximum or minimum
indication by the slave status register indicates an error condition in the





























































Figure 5-1 Intarprocsssor Communication
and Holing Tnrougn a SIR Interstaga (SimplSK]
2. Three Value Data Transfer
The procedure for exchanging and comparing the data generated by the
external sensors (assuming that one sensor value of a data triad is supplied
to each of the active node's external ports) follows a similiar approach. As
shown in Figure 5-2, the exchange can be made in a more concurrent manner
in this case. The nodes are assumed to be in loose synchronization which is
justified by the relatively short duration of the control cycle being executed
in the SIR system and the synchronization task that is the precursor to each
control cycle execution (as shown in Figure 3-4).
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The data to be voted is supplied to each of the active node's
interstages by either SIR external sensors or generated internally by the
flight law calculation task. An additional source of data to be voted is the
command words of the inter-SIR communication protocol discussed in
section C. The data can be considered to be a triad of simplex data at the
beginning of the exchange process. Each of the data values that are to be
exchanged are independently generated.
The process of exchange is begins by each of the nodes transfenng
their simplex data values to registers A, B, and C of their respective
interstages. The process of loading a starting value in the interstages is
concurrently performed as contrasted with the procedure shown in Figure
5-1.
After one exchange cycle among the interstages, each interstage
contains the complete triad of simplex data values. A vote is then made on
the data triad by each of the interstages. The procedure after the vote
depends on the type of data transfer that is being made. If the data transfer
is of the invarient type, ie the values must exactly match, then the slave
status register contains all of the information necessary to test for three
way equality or, conversely, the indication of an error condition within the
active SIR component set. The value in register A after the vote can then be
transfered to the node's host processor and execution can continue.
































Figure 5-2 InterprGcsssor Communication and
Doting Tnrough a SIB Intsrstags (Tnree llalusd)
If the data to be exchanged and voted upon is of the varient type then
the contents of the A, B, and C registers must be transfered to the node's
host processor. At the completion of the vote process register A contains
the mid value while registers B and C contain the maximum and minimum
values respectively. The host calculates the difference between the
minimum and maximum values and compares the difference with the
maximum bound for the data word that is being cross linked and voted If
the difference exceeds the maximum bounds for the data word, then the
error condition indicates either a failed component within the active sel of
SIR components or a failed component in the sensor/DSPM system. A preset
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test must be performed if the data triad originated externally to the SIR
system. An out of bounds condition on internally generated data indicates a
SIR component failure. The cause of an internally generated failure can be
attributed to either hardware or to one of the N-version programs that carry
out the flight law calculations. Fault location algorithms must then be used
to locate the faulty component and remove it from the set of components
that interface with the systems external to the SIR architecture.
The midvalue that is contained in register A at the completion of the
vote will be taken as the correct value for further program execution. The
differences between the midvalue and the minimum and maximum values is
used to locate which of the two values caused the variation bound violation.
The value that is closest to the midvalue is the value that is assumed to be
fault free. The value associated with the larger difference is assumed to be
the value caused by a component (or software) fault. Again, the fault could
have been caused by the node, link, software, or an externally applied SIR
input.
3. Two Value Data Transfer
There is the possibility that only two values are made available to
the SIR system. The data must be cross linked and voted in this case also.
The condition can be caused in two separate ways. The first cause is a
characteristic of the external system that is used to supply the SIR
architecture with input data. A sensor failure in the external sensor set
that supplies the SIR input data would cause only two values to be presented
to the active processor set. A DSPM system link failure could also isolate a
sensor and prevent communication of its data to the SIR system.
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Internal SIR fault conditions cause the second category where two
data values must be cross linked and voted. The removal of a SIR processor
by either a processor failure, or a combination of SIR link failures that
isolate a good processor, sets up a condition where the active processor set
consists of only two processors.
In the first case, an assumption is made that there is a full
complement of active SIR processors and the appropiate links. The
discovery of the external fault which causes the two valued data must be
globally distributed to the active SIR processor set. With this global
knowledge, the SIR processors are aware of which two processors will
receive the data. The data is cross linked in the same way as in the simplex
data case for each of the data values that is recieved by the SIR system. At
this point, each of the three active processors contains both of the
externally supplied values.
With only two values available, the concept of a midvalue vote is not
appropiate. The values are instead transferred to the host computers in each
of the nodes. The difference is taken between the two values and the
variation bound test is applied to this difference. If the difference between
the two values is within the variation bounds, then an average is taken in
each processor. These averages are then cross linked among the processors
by the three value communication algorithm. The averages that are cross
linked should be an exact match, because the node components are identical
from both a hardware and software view. (The software for system control
is not performed by use of N-version programming techniques.) If the two
data values generate an out of bounds variation when they are compared,
then reasonability tests are applied to the two values and the more
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reasonable of the two is selected. The confidence is less than is achieved
with values that remain within the limits on deviation, but continued
system operation is maintained. The reasonability tests are based on past
values and the rates of change for the sensor type as well as implications
that can be drawn from combinations of data supplied from other types of
sensors. Some upper limit is necessary on the number of different sensors
that can be in this reduced sensor set condition, but the upper limit and the
level of confidence required will not be addressed in this paper.
If the two valued case arises due to a fault that is internal to the SIR
architecture, then a slight variation of the approach described above can be
used. In this case there are only two communicating processors; the faulty
processor has been powered down. The interstage registers that would have
been used to connect the faulty processor are in a cleared state so the vote
process still correctly functions in the remaining processors, (the vote
instruction from the host processor to the interstage is the only means of
generating an output from the s-lave status register to the host. This
restriction was designed into the interstage controller to simplify the
controller design.)
The two received values, one at each of the active processors, are
processed as discussed for the case of two data values and three good
processors. The only difference is that the minimum value is excluded from
consideration in the final cross link and vote of the averages.
B. SYSTEM STATES
There are 2n system states in systems that contain n components and




For the three processor case the number of components is 6
when the links are included. This means that there are 64 system states for
the three processor SIR architecture. This set of system states includes all
permutations of 6 components where each component can be failed or good.
The SIR architecture is operationally dependant on a TMR system. This
condition results in the complete set of 64 system states not being useful.
Acceptable confidence in the correct system output in TMR systems can only
be achieved when at least two of the three processors agree on the value to
be output from the system. System states where there are more than one
faulty processor can no longer provide even minimum confidence in the
values being generated for output to the external system. Combinations of
processor faults and link faults that isolate two fault free processors are
also not useful; if the two good processors cannot communicate, then there
is no possibility of an explicit agreement on data values even if both
processors are producing identical values.
The SIR system has another pertinent characteristic that effects the
number of system states that are useful in redundancy management. There
is no overall system controlling processor or component. Decisions on the
correctness of the values that are supplied by the remaining active
processors are made independently in each of the active processors.
There will several system states that are identical in the number and
type of components that are faulty. The difference in these system states
is apparent only in the labeling of the faulty components, if there is no
overall system that controls the redundancy management, then the label
changes are meaningless to the reliability calculations. This is true
because the duplicated components used in the 5IR architecture have an
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equal impact on the system if they fail and the probability of components of
a like class failing is identical. A failure of processor A has no less and no
more effect than the failure of processor B, if there are no other component
failures in the system.
The calculation of the number of "good" system states in a TMR system,
where good implies that the minimum TMR confidence level is met, is
straightforward. The binomial coefficient notation is a compact way of
describing the number of ways a subset of objects can be selected from a
larger set. The notation for the binomial coefficient is shown in Figure 5-3.
The binomial coefficient calculates the number of ways that a subset of
objects can be selected from a larger global set of objects where the order







Figura 5-3 Binomial Ccefficisnt Notation
For the purposes of modeling TMR system states, the X term in the
binomial coefficient will represent the number of components in the
system. The Y term in the binomial coefficient will represent the number of
faulty components in the set of X components.
A further breakdown is necessary to correctly represent the system
state aggregations that will be developed. Two fault free communicating
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processors is the condition required for continued operation of a TMR
system. There are two component types in the system (the nodes and the
communications links), so a complete representation of possible fault
combinations must take the two component nature of 'the system into
account. This is easily accommodated by the binomial coefficient notation
by simply treating each component class separately and multiplying the two
resulting values. The notation convention used will place the processor
term first in the processor/ link multiplicative pair.
Figure 5-4 shows the resulting equation for calculating the number of
system states where continued TMR operation is possible, where the first
factor of each term is the number of ways to choose fault-free processors
and the second factor is the number of ways to choose fault-free links.
These states are referred to as good states, although the confidence level
varies among the states groups this set categorizes.
Number of "qood" system states
Qdxx) >0(lH])(l)
R)K?)-'K)[®-2 ]
= (l)(I) + (l)(3) + ( 1X3) (3X1) + (3X3- l)+ (3X3 -2)
= 19
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A graphical representation of the fault classes that are sustainable by
the TMR system is shown in Figure 5-5. The figure shows components that
are faulty by using highlighted lines. Each fault class shows the
corresponding term from Figure 5-4 to indicate the number of system states
that can exist for that particular fault class* (identical but for label
changes).
A larger aggregation of fault classes can be made after studying the
fault classes shown in Figure 5-5. The classes shown in the Figure 5-5c
through 5-5f have a. important characteristic in common; one of the
processors in the active set of processors is either faulty, or isolated from
the remaining active processors by faulty communications links or 3
combination of both. Any of these four fault classes will of necessity be
treated in the same fashion, the two remaining, communicating processors
will assume that the third processor is faulty and proceed accordingly.
There will be a number of death states in the TMR system. The death
states are composed of fault classes that do not allow the minimum TMR
confidence level to be met. The number of death states is calculated in the
same manner as for the number of good system states. A naive assumption
can be made that the number of death states is simply the number of states
remaining after subtracting the good states from the total number of states.
This is not the case. The definition of a death state is one in which there
are no further transitions possible. Implied in this statement is that there
is some starting state for the system, ideally a fault free state. The
assumption for only single fault arrivals in the SIR system has already been
justified in Chapter IV. The combination of these two characteristics
results in a reduced set of death states.
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Figures 5-6 and 5-7 show the calculation of the number of death states
possible in a TMR system and a graphical representation of the fault classes
for system death states respectively. Each of the fault classes that are
depicted in Figures 5-6 and 5-7 correspond to a fault class that is entered
by a single fault arrival.
The system states remaining after the death states and the good states
are subtracted from the total number of system states are classified as
impossible system states for a TMR system. The reasoning for this
classification is a result of the TMR characteristics together with the
single fault arrival characteristic of the SIR system. All of the impossible
state fault classes can only be achieved by way of a death state. By
definition, there are no transitions allowed leaving a death state. The
impossible states simply cannot be reached. (This assumes that the system
shuts itself down when a death state occurs.)
The enumeration of the impossible states for the SIR (TMR) system is
shown in Figures 5-8 and 5-9. These states can not be reached in the SIR
system, so they will not be included in any configuration management
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Number of system "death" states
= ( ! )( I ) + (3)(2) * (3)( I ) + (3)( 1 ) (3)( I ) 0)(3) (3X2)
= 31
Figure 5-6 Calculation of the Number
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Figure 5-8 Calculation of the Number
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C. INTER-SIR COMMUNCATIONS AND
FAULT LOCATION PROTOCOLS
The cross communication of data values between the active set of SIR
nodes is necessarily dependant on a rigidly defined order of events and
reactions to the outcomes of those events. This rigid operating procedure,
called a communications protocol, is a straight forward method of
exchanging information reliably between the node processors. Section A of
this chapter described the method in which data is exchanged and voted in
order to assure a reliable, congruent data exchange.
The TMR operating environment must also be able to react correctly to a
fault arrival. Correct reaction to a fault means that the system must
reconfigure the system components such that the set of active core
components comprises, as close as possible, a complete set of good
components. Correct reaction to a fault arrival requires that the fault not
only be detected, but also be located. The algorithms for cross linking data
values between the active processor set is adequate to detect a faulty
component, however using these algorithms alone, the fault can only be
located to a possible set of components consisting of the node from which
the offending value arrived, the link over which it arrived, and the external
input system (for the case of system input data).
The knowledge of a fault occurrence must also be tranmitted to all of the
active nodes. It is quite possible that the fault can be detected at only one
of the nodes in the active processor set. For example, this could happen by a
failure of the control signal that enables the shift out operation (shift
right) on the B or C registers in one of the system's interstages (re, Figure
2-3). If the failure occurs in node A and the failure effects the path to node
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B, then node B is the only node in the system that can detect the error. As
an example, consider the case where processor A operates correctly, other
than the inability to enable the shift right instruction of the register
connected to node B. Node C will not be able to detect the fault because the
path to node A is functioning correctly. Processor A will not be able to
detect the fault because the shift right operation of the offending shift
register does not effect either the node's voter or the ability to recieve a
data word from node B correctly.
In a TMR system, at least two communicating processors must agree on
the result before confidence is placed in the result. This requirement also
applies to fault detection. For the example above, if node B does not obtain
corroboration of the detection of the fault in processor A (or the link
between nodes A and B), then the consensus of the active processor set will
be that node B is in error, even though node A is actually the faulty node.
A system for the exchange of fault detection must therefore be included
in the communications protocol. Because the occurrence of a fault in the
system is not the expected result (the system uses relatively reliable
components), there must be a preset, recognizable method that explicitly
states the intent to communicate a fault arrival rather than the next data
word to be communicated. The preset signals that are used to indicate
conditions within the SIR active processor set will be referred to as
inter-SIR protocol command words, or just command words.
There are two methods that are generally used to differentiate the
command words and the data words. The first is to send the word in a
message format where there is a preset sequence of words expected, for
example, a command word followed by a data word. If enough information
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needs to be transmitted with the data, then more than one command word
can be sent in the message, again with the words in a preset sequence. The
second method that can be used is to modify a frame synch bit, as in the
case of the MIL-STD-1553 protocol. When a synch bit is available for use in
this manner, there is more latitude available in the order of the words sent.
A reduction in the total transmitted volume of information can be achieved
in this manner. Each data word does not necessarily need a command word
preceding it; expected data traffic can procede in an ordered manner, and if
errors are detected, then a command word can be inserted into the data
stream and be recognized as such by the difference in the synch bit.
The SIR architecture does not use synch bits in the transfer of data
between it's internal nodes. The former method must therefore be used so
that there is no possibility that data can be misinterpreted as command
words and vice versa.
The structure of the command words must be designed so that the
originator of a command word is included in the word. This knowledge is
needed in the activation of an offline spare to insure that the active
processors are all aware of the actual configuration of active nodes The
set of command words must also be large enough to indicate all of the
possible faults that can be generated by a cross link process. The indication
of a fault can be communicated among processors by sending the status of a
vote. In this case the command word structure must be robust enough to
include all possibilities of results that can be generated. The indication of
an out of bounds condition is not sufficient; the processor that deviated
from the allowable bound must be indicated in the command word.
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The detailed design of the command word structure will not be addressed
in this paper. The high level protocols developed will assume an appropiate
command word structure for the task. The discussion above is included for
completeness of the discussion on the communications protocols.
The node processor acts as the controlling element of a fully
controllable n x 2 full duplex switch, where the switch is actually the
node's rotary multiplexer (n is the number of remaining processors in the
given SIR architecture). Control of the paths selected to connect the rotary
multiplexer input ports with the multiplexer output ports is established by
the control word supplied to the rotary multiplexer by the node's host
processor. The process of changing the routing of the paths through the
multiplexer also changes the composition of link subcomponents that
comprises a particular system link. The single fault arrival assumption
assures that if the component that has actually failed is the link, then only
one terminal end of the link has failed. Although the subcomponent
compositions of the links are now different, each new path is an
independent circuit once the control word has been loaded into the set of
rotary multiplexer flip flops (as discussed in Chapter II B).
The notation shown in Figure 5-10 will make the following discussion
easier to follow. Each of the nodes contains 4 parts of a communications
path: two are incoming simplex paths and two are outgoing simplex paths.
These paths are indicated as 1 and 2 in the Figure 5-10, with the direction
indicated by the subscript i for input and o for output. The paths will
always be manipulated as pairs. For example, a node's number 2 path will be
directed to the same external node for both the input and output subscripts.
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Using the notation introduced by Figure 5-10, a link is composed of 2
pairs of components. For example, the link between nodes A and B in the
figure are represented by the component pair Bl A2 and the link between the
nodes A and C is represented by the component pair A1C2.
The communication requirement between processor pairs consists of a
communications path in both directions. Each path has hardware
components located at the terminal ends of the path, however all of the link
components must be operational for the link between the connected nodes to
be classified as good. No inconsistency with the concept of a link
component being the combination of the hardware at both ends of the link is
introduced by the additional information shown in Figure 5-10.
Because the rotary multiplexer is fully controllable, each of the selected
paths through the rotary multiplexer can be associated with either of the
interstage communications registers. The B interstage register pair
(consisting of registers B and B' in Figure 2-3) of node A can be routed to
either node B or node C.
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The ability to switch the interstage register pair associated with a link
path allows isolation of the fault in the communications path (consisting of
the interstage and the link) to either the interstage or the link itself,
thereby providing fault location. If the fault is caused by the inability of
node A's interstage register (B) to shift right, as in the example, then
changing the external node that is connected with the B register to the
other active node will provide that second node with an indication of a
communications fault. Now two of the three nodes have received an
indication of a communiations fault associated with node A, and the fault is
isolated to the interstage of node A
The approach of switching the external nodes connected to a particular
interstage register pair is a sufficient location test for node faults that
effect only the interface with the rotary multiplexer. The same method also
correctly identifies a node that fails to correctly input communicated data
into it's primed interstage registers.
An example is the best way to show that the path switching method can
uniquely locate a fault under the single fault arrival assumption. The
results of a cross link of a dat3 word can manifest itself in three basic
ways. The first case is for two nodes to indicate the same fault. Under a
single fault arrival assumption, this leads to the unique conclusion that the
indicated node is bad. A second case is for all three nodes to agree on the
vote outcome, in which case the voting process is assumed correct. If the
vote outcome is that all data values are correct, then all system
components are considered fault free and the system proceeds. If the vote
outcome indicates a particular word is bad (not equal or out of range) then
two cases can apply. If the word is internally generated (a command word
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or a data word produced by the flight law calculations), then the node that
produced the erring word must be bad. If the word is produced by a source
external to the SIR architecture (DSPM) then a preset test word must be
used in a cross link test. If each voter status agrees the outcome of this
test (using invarient data transfer) then the fault is external to the SIR and
the DSPM redundancy management routines are notified of the fault.
The third case applies if the results of the vote test do not agree (for the
preset word test or for the original vote outcome). A series of additional
tests must be performed to isolate the fault. If two nodes indicate the
same node as faulty, then by the single fault arrival assumption, the
indicated node must be faulty. If only one node has indicated a fault then
more tests must be implemented. (If the node indicates that both the other
nodes are faulty, then the single fault arrival assumption implies that the
node which indicates the faults is bad.)
Figure 5-1 1 depicts the possible test outcomes for a set of three tests
(a, b, and c). Test outcome (a) in Figure 5-1 1 shows a possible senario
where only one node indicates a fault. (This test outcome is generated by
the data cross link that supplied the initial fault detection.) The rows in
the figure indicate the test outcomes of each of the nodes with the columns
indicating the nodes on which the test was performed. A good test outcome
is represented by a and a faulty test outcome is represented by a X. The
possible faults that could cause these outcomes are also indicated in the
figure. There are several possible faults that could generate the test
outcome shown in Figure 5- 11 a. A second test is needed to isolate the
actual fauit condition that caused the test outcome shown in Figure 5-1 la.
A logical second test switches the paths through node C's rotary multiplexer
85
and repeats the data cross link which initially generated the test outcome
shown in Figure 5-1 la. The possible outcomes of the second test are shown
as test outcomes b. 1 through b.3 in Figure 5-11. (The single fault arrival
assumption limits the possible outcomes.) Unique fault locations are
provided for each of the test outcomes except for test outcome b.2 in Figure
5-11 In this case the fault can't be isolated with just this test. A third
test is needed. The logical approach is to exchange the paths through the
rotary multiplexer of node A and cross link and vote again. The possible
outcomes of this new test is indicated in test outcomes c. 1 through c.2 in
Figure 5-11. The outcomes of this second test are unambiguous under a
single fault arrival assumption so no further test are necessary. The fault
has been isolated. The set of faults listed as the possible causes of the test
outcome shown in Figure 5-1 1c. 1 is a simplification. The test outcome
isolates the fault to the outgoing end of a link that resides at processor A
The failure could also be in the interstage of processor A, however. If that
is in fact the case, then node A is actually faulty and not the link. The test
isolates the fault to that single outbound path from node A however, and
verifies that the remaining path out of node A is functioning correctly. For
the three processor case, the fault has been isolated to a sufficient degree
and no other test is necessary. For the case of the SIR architecture with
spares, an indication should be registered that either the outbound path
through the interstage in node A is faulty or that the outbound link from
node A is faulty. In either case the node should be replaced with a
completely fault free spare (with requisite links). The node is not however
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Figure 5-1 1 Possible Test Outcomes
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The two cases of link failure (the input half of a link or the output half
of a link) can actually be thought of a single case because the link must be
full duplex for correct operation. Failure of both simplex paths associated
with a single duplex link is not consistant with the single fault arrival
assumption that was validated in Chapter IV, unless the fault lies in a
node's hardware or software and not the node's link hardware. This will
happen in two separate cases: the node processor supplies an incorrectly
ordered set of bits to the set of flip flops in the rotary multiplexer, or the
failure of the AND gate that controls the loading of new values into the
rotary multiplexer flip flops. In either case, the nodes that are connected
by the rotary multiplexer have no opportunity to agree on data values. The
ideal TMR operation is no longer possible and an alternative is required.
While ideal TMR operation is no longer possible in the nodes that are
connected by the faulty link, the remaining active processor can still
perform an ideal TMR operation. If all three processors remain in service,
then the node not directly affected by the faulty link has become a single
point of failure for the system. It must relay data words between the two
processors that have the faulty link in common. Neither of the remaining
links is a single point of error for the system, nor are the nodes that have
the failed link in common. A single failure of either of the remaining good
links results in the isolation of a processor, but there are still two
communicating processors in the system and, as discussed in section A.2,
operation can continue.
Figure 5-12 shows a flowchart of the communications and fault location
protocol. The operational modes for cross linking data under varying fault
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D. RELIABILITY MODEL
All of the necessary information has now been developed for applying the
semi-Markov model to the three processor case of the SIR architecture. The
model will be shown graphically as discussed in Chapter IV, and is shown in
Figure 5-13.
Xp » 5.9423 x 10 A
X L - 3.4519 x
10"6
Figure 5-13 (a) nella&Miij Mods! for trie
Tlires Processor 513 firc^itacture (complete)
94
X L + 2X P
5.5(C) H 5.7
Xp
Xp- 5.9423 x 10"4
X L = 3.4519 x
10"6
Figure 5-13 (o) ReHabiHty Model for the
Three Processor Sin Architecture
Note that there are two seperate Xs that are used to indicate the arrival
of a fault. (Recall that the arrival of a fault corresponds to a^state
transition in the semi-Markov model.) Xp will denote the arrival of a
processor fault, while Xj_ will denote the arrival of a link fault.
There are no system recovery transitions possible for the three
processor case of the SIR architecture. This is because there are no spares
associated with the system. The system is tolerant of faults, with the
number of faults that can be tolerated being a function of the order in which
the faults arrive. Therefore, use of the notation descibed in Chapter IV
corresponds to a linear state transition graph.
The notation that is used in the reliability model refers to the fault
classes that were described in section B of this chapter. For example, the
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fault free category is notationally listed as state 5.5(a). The notation
refers to Figure 5.5 (a) to describe the fault classification that corresponds
to the state.
A good deal of state aggregation is used in the reliability model shown in
Figure 5-13. The death state categories that are shown in Figure 5-7 are
unique classifications of faults, however for the purposes of the model, the
classification of subcategories of a death state is not important.
Therefore, the figure shows a single death state. The path that is followed
in the figure to arrive at the death state identifies the fault class of the
death state.
Figure 5- 13a shows the complete set of good states for the three
processor case and the possible transitions due to fault arrivals. The states
that are shown enclosed within the dotted box are effectively identical with
respect to system states that follow and with respect to the
communications and operational algorithms that are used in each of the
states. A super state aggregation can therefore be made and no reliability
information will be lost.
The transitions that are made inside the dotted box are included only to
show a complete exhaustion of system components. The algorithm that
detects and locates a fault would not actually allow the transitions internal
to the dotted box to take place. This is because when a processor is
determined to be faulty the fault is considered to be a permanent fault and
the processor is powered down. Because the fault decision is made by the
two nodes that aren't faulty (or isolated) the actual condition of the node
that is voted as faulty is not relevant. The single fault arrival assumption
assures that the correct node is powered down because both of the nodes
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that decide the fault cannot be faulty. The states shown as (c), (d), (e), and
(f) in Figure 5-5 are therefore actually one distinct state as viewed by the
redundancy management algorithm. This is shown in Figure 5- 13b where the
state shown as 5.5(C) represents all of the states within the dotted box in
Figure 5- 13a.
Rather than show a seperate transition for the link and node fault
arrivals, a notation is used that is more compact notationally, while losing
none of the actual reliability information. If two transitions leaving a
particular state both arrive at the same next state, then the probability of
transitioning between the two states is just the summation of the two
transitional probabilities. The collapsed notation helps keep the model
diagram from becoming cluttered unnecessarily.
VI. THE SIR ARCHITECTURE WITH SPARES
The SIR architecture is obviously designed with the operation of spares
in mind. The addition of the rotary multiplexer is made for just this
purpose. The development of the three processor case was necessary
because in all of the cases of the SIR architecture that utilize spares, the
active set of processors remains a three processor core. The method in
which the system detects faults is identical whe.ther the spares are
included or not. The introduction of faults to the system over time
eventually leads to some mode of the three processor case. This will happen
when processors fail and are replaced in the active core by spares. A failed
processor is now placed in a spare position, however there is no possibility
of restoring the failed processor to active status. The set of available
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spares is therefore reduced by one processor. Continuation of this process
leads to the depletion of the spares and thus effectively results in a mode
of the three processor case. In a like manner, the failure of links can
isolate processors. The results are the same; effective reduction to some
mode of the three processor case.
The task of the operating protocol is a little different in the SIR system
with spares. The location process is even more meaningful in this case,
because a history must be kept of all the faults that have occurred in the
system to date. The loss of a single link may cause the swapout of a
processor. However the processor that is placed in spare status is still
functional, and may be used in a different configuration of the active core
so the core is always composed of fully functional components. Of course
this depends on the number of spares in the system (with the requisite
number of links for full interconnection) and the fault history. With this
possibility in mind, the algorithm that determines how the spares are to be
managed is key to the reliability model of the system as a whole.
The amount of system state information and the complexity of the
system grows at an exponential rate as can be seen by the 2n figure for the
number of system states. The number of processors grows in a linear
fashion with the addition of spares to the system. The number of links
grows at a greater rate however. Because the system is composed of fully
connected processors the addition of a single processor causes the addition
of a number of links equal to the number of processors in the system before
the addition of the new processor. Addition of the first spare causes the
addition of three new links to the system. The second added spare causes
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the addition of four new links. All the while, the complexity of the system
in terms of system states is growing at 2n
.
There are aggregations of system states that can be made in the four
processor case similar to the way in which state aggregations were made
for the three processor case. For the same reasons as given in Chapter V,
there will be a number of impossible system states that can be immediately
eliminated from consideration in the reliability model as well as the
operating protocol.
The death states in the SIR system with spares will be a larger set of
fault classes for several reasons. The obvious reason is that there are more
components in the system. Secondly, the system will always be in a death
state when two of the active core of processors fail, even when there is a
full complement of good spares. This condition occurs whenever the fault
arrivals in the active core of components happens faster than the recovery
process. This possibility of system failure prior to the exhaustion of the
spare set emphasizes the need to make the recovery process as quick as
possible. When a link or a processor fails, the processors remaining in the
active core must replace a processor by an appropriate spare in order to
return the active core to a fully operational component set.
The operation includes selection of the appropriate spare and testing of
the spare and its link with the two processors selected to remain active (if
the fault was a link failure, then there are two choices for which active
processor will be placed in a spare status.) A process of updating the new
addition to the set of active processors must be performed when an
acceptable node is found. The DSPM state table must be transferred to the
new node as well as the fault history in the SIR system. State information
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for the application software must also be transferred, particularity past
data input history that is used in calculating the reasonableness of a
suspect new data word. All of this information is necessary and it's
communication will consume time. Of course the data transfer must be of
the invarient type for transfer of system state information.
The TMR operation of the SIR system and the single fault arrival
assumption assure that that there will not be more than one fault in the
active set of processors unless there is no possibility to transition to a
configuration (through the use of components in the set of spares) that
contains less faults than in the present active core of components. V/hen a
fault arrives in the active core a search is undertaken to locate a fault free
spare node such that its links with respect to the two communicating nodes
from the active set are also fault free. Which of the spares selected (if
any) is dependant on the location of the detected fault in the active set of
components as well as the state of both the spare nodes and the spare links
(with respect to the active set of nodes).
A question arises as to the number of states that are needed to
completely specify all possible system states that can exist under the SIR
operating environment. A search for a replacement node for the active set
is not undertaken until a fault that arrives in the active set of components,
is detected, and located. Recall that the system nodes are fully
interconnected but that the search for a configuration that will improve
that of the active core (with respect to the number of faulty components) is
performed only by the nodes currently in the active set. The links that are
terminated only on spare nodes can be discounted because the state of these
links are not observable by the nodes in the active set which are making the
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decisions. This means that there are a set of three links which connect each
spare node with the active set of nodes (see Figure 6-1). The number of
possible states that can exist among the spare links (discounting links
connecting spares) is thus 23n
,
where n is the number of spares in the
system. Because the single fault arrival assumption is not valid for the
spare conponents (the test interval for the spare components could be much
longer than the test interval for active components) any of these states are
possible when a fault arrives within active core. The fault that arrives in
the active core will be detected and located, however because the
probability of a fault occurring is equal among like components (nodes or
links), all possible positions of that fault in the active core must be
accounted for in order to assure that all possible paths through the
Semi-Markov model are considered. The number of states is then three
times the number of possible states within the set of spares, or 3 x 23n
,
which reduces to 3(8)n -
Active Core
Spares
Figure 6-1 Sin Architecture w\Xh Spares
Suppose however that only the number of link faults for each of the
spares is known (with respect to the nodes in the active core). Note that
three link faults between a particular spare and the nodes in the active core
will isolate the spare and is thus equivalent to a failed spare (with respect
to the current configuration of the active core). Four states are therefore
required to indicate the information concerning each set (which consists of
a spare and the links that terminate on both the spare and one of the nodes
in the active core). Because there are n such sets, the total number of
states required is (4)n . The total number of states required to describe the
system is then (4)n times the three possible positions of the fault that has
just arrived in the active core, or 3(4)n
Suppose that the following conjecture is true. All nonredundant state
information is retained in the latter system state description. An example





Figure 6-2 Sample Fault Senario for
SIR Rrchitecture luith Spares
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Assume a link failure has occurred within the active core and that there
are 2 faulty links between spare 51 and the nodes in the active core. There
are 3 possible ways that the 2 failed spare links could be configured with
respect to the failed link in the active core. Two of the ways are
topologically equivalent. This case arises when L2 or L3 is the failed link in
the active core and LSI and L52 are the failed links associated with 51.
These are equivalent topologies because in either case two of the active
nodes each have 1 failed link with respect to the remaining active core and
the spare 51 while the remaining node in the active core has 2 failed links
associated with it. In the remaining case (with LI, LSI, and LS2 faulty) 2
active nodes have 2 associated faulty links. The same number of possible
system topologies would have resulted by fixing the active link failure and
varying the 2 failed spare links in all possible combinations.
If the state is represented by the unique number of failed links
associated with the spares and the occurrence of a link failure in the active
core, then all of the state information is still contained in the model only if
three transitions are shown for the state recovery. Effectively, some of the
state information is represented in the transitions leaving a state. The
positional dependance of the failure in the active core actually represents
three states. The specification of which state is actually present in the
three state aggregation is contained in the recovery transition that is
selected in leaving the three state aggregation. These transitions must
correspond to fixing the failed spare links and varying the position of the
active link failure. In the case shown above, two of these transitions are
equivalent so the probability of transitioning to the recovery state
indicated by these equivalent topologies is 2 times as great as the
03
probability for the transition indicated by the remaining topology (the
active link failure is L2).
An assumption will be made in this paper that the conjecture discussed
above is, in general, valid. The number of states needed in the models are
thereby reduced from 3(8)n to 3(4)n which is significant for cases of n as
small as 2 (the five processor case).
A. THE FOUR PROCESSOR CASE
The four processor case of the SIR architecture consists of the three
processor active core and a spare processor (and the links that connect the
processors). Following the procedure that was developed in Chapter V, the.
set of system states can be broken down into a set of good system states, a
set of death states, and a set of impossible states.
Figure 6-3 shows the set of possible states in which TMR operation is
possible within the active processor core. The notation used in the figure is
slightly modified, so that "S" represents a spare processor.
The labels on the links were not added to this figure. No real information
is provided by the labeling of the links because each of the fault classes
represents all combinations possible by label changing of the particular
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Several aggregations of the fault classes that are labeled good are made
in the figure. Figure 6-3 (d) represents a class of "good" system states that
will be assumed to be impossible states in the model for the four processor
SIR system. The impetus for this decision is based on the assumption of
single fault arrivals in the components that comprise the active core. A
system reconfiguration is always implemented, if possible, when a single
fault is detected in the active core. The length of time that will be allowed
to perform the reconfiguration will be limited to the maximum bounds on
the control cycle. Chapter IV validated a single fault arrival assumption for
the active component set, therefore under the single fault arrival
assumption the set of fault classes shown in Figure 6-3 (d) are impossible.
Each of the fault classes have more that one fault in the active core and a
reconfiguration is possible to a core with a larger number of good
components.
The fault classes that are shown in Figure 6-3 (1.), (n.), and (o.) are each
aggregate classes that effectively equate to the fault classes for the three
processor case shown in Figure 5-5. Each of the aggregates shown in (U,
(n.), and (o.) are actually larger than indicated in the figure. For reasons of
space in the figure, the three cases of a failed spare and the links
connecting it to the active core were not shown (one, two, or three failed
links). The aggregations do not change for these cases because a failed node
causes an effective failure in the links associated with it.
The death states and the remaining impossible states for the four
processor system do not need to be shown for cases other than the three
processor case. The TMR requirement for two active processors is
applicable only to the active core, any faults that take the active core to
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less that two active processors that are able to communicate with each
other is a death state. All combinations of spare processors and links in
their good or failed states can be aggregated into this overall death state.
The number of states that must be managed for the four processor case
has been reduced from 2' to just 15 (including the death state). The task
remaining is to develop an algorithm that effectively manages these states
and sets up appropriate transitions between them. Given the algorithm and
the state aggregations shown in Figure 6-3, a semi-Markov model can be
constructed.
1. Recovery Algorithm
The algorithms that were discussed in Chapter V for detection of
faults in the active core apply, with minor changes, to the case of the SIR
architecture with spares. The major difference is that once a fault has been
detected and located, a search for a spare is undertaken. The goal of the
search is to find a spare that, when activated, brings the complement of
good components in the core back to 6 (3 processors and 3 links). Short of
this, a reconfiguration is desired that will connect three good processors
with 2 good links. The final course of action is to use just 2 good
processors and a single link connecting them, and power down the remaining
processors in the system..
For the case of one spare, there are not many possibilities to be
checked in the search. If the detection algorithm indicates that a processor
has failed, then the spare is activated, and the failed processor is
deactivated.
There are several cases that can occur when the spare is activated.
The spare- components are in a deactivated state and it is not possible to
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test these components using the algorithms described in Chapter V. The set
of spare components is therefore subject to fault arrival rates greater than
for the case of the active core. The spare can be in a failed state, or either
of the links, or both, connecting the spare with the remaining good
processors can be failed. If both links are failed, the spare will behave as if
it is failed. If the spare is failed, or both links associated with the spare
are failed, then the two processors in the active core will deactivate the
spare and operate in a 2 processor mode.
If one of the links between the spare and the active processors is
failed, then a 3 processor/2 link mode of operation is set up. Note that the
initial load of system state values to the spare must be validated as
correct. To validate the state values, the spare relays the data back to the
active processor with which the spare has a good link. At the same time the
node that has 2 good links (the "center node") sends the state information to
the remaining active processor. In this way, the center node performs a
check on the state data contained in all three processors. Note that the
center processor has become a single point of failure for the system.
A similar process is performed for the case of a link failure detection
in the active core. In this case, a decision must be made as to which of the
two nodes coincident with the failed link is to be deactivated. If there is a
link failure in one of the links that connects to the spare, then the choice is
critical. The wrong choice leads to selection of a configuration that is not
optimum for the set of nonf ailed components. A way out of this delimma is
to not deactivate a node. Instead, one of the nodes that is coincident with
the failed link can be placed in a wait state by setting that node"s watch dog
timer appropriately. The two remaining nodes attempt to establish
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communication with the spare in the manner indicated above. If a complete
set of components for the core is established, then the active node in the
wait state is deactivated and held in reserve (only one link is faulty, there
is still a chance that the node may have a good link with the newly activated
spare). If a complete set of core components is not achieved, then the
process is performed again with the roles of the nodes that are incident
with the failed active link reversed. Of course, this algorithm requires
establishing communication and performing a synchronization with the node
that is in the wait state.
The history of fault occurrences and where they are located is
maintained in each processor. This enables past knowledge to assist in
choosing the best strategy on the occurrence of a new fault in the active
core. The algorithm described allows recognition of all of the states that
are shown in Figure 6-3 (except for (d) which is an impossible state).
2. Reliability Model
A graphical display of the reliability model for the four processor
case of the SIR architecture is shown in Figure 6-4. The model shows all of
the possible transitions between the state aggregations that are shown in
Figure 6-3. The notation used in Figure 6-4 is modified slightly from that
used in Chapter V. Because of the complexity introduced in the system by
the addition of the spare node and the associated links, it was not
convenient to follow the horizontal and vertical paths to represent fault
arrivals and recoveries respectively. Each of the transitions in Figure 6-4
are instead labeled with X's and ex's. The X's represent fault arrivals and
are further classified to indicate which type of fault has occurred. The
subscripts shown indicate a fault as being an active processor (P), an active
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link (L), an inactive link to the spare (SL), or the spare processor (5). The
recovery times are assumed to be identical for each of the fault classes.
The labeling of the states in Figure 6-4 refer to the fault classes shown in
Figure 6-3.
The (f) fault class shown in Figure 6-3 was seperated into two
distinct fault classes in Figure 6-4. If the link fault in the active core is
the link between PI and P2, a recovery can be made to state (i). This
recovery restores a full complement of good components to the active core.
The same recovery is possible if the faulty link in the active core is
between PI and P3. If the faulty link is the one between P2 and P3,
however, the only configurations possible in this case are composed of an
active core with three good processors and two good links and no
improvement can be achieved. This case is labeled (f2) in Figure 6-4 and the
former two cases are labeled (f 1). All recovery transitions from a single
state are assumed to have equal probability. The probability of a particular
recovery transition is indicated notationally as <*
n
,
where n equals the
inverse of the probability of that transition (and the number of transition
that leave that particular state). For example, in state (k) of Figure 6-4,
there are three recovery transitions possible depending on the position of
the failed processor in the active core. Two of these three transitions go to
the same state and are represented as 2<xy The remaining trransition has a
probability of 1/3 and is represented as <y,y
Figure 6-4 Reliability Mode! for the
Four Processor Sin Architecture
B. THE FIVE PROCESSOR CASE
The process described in section A of this chapter can be extended to
architectures that start with a larger number of spares The algorithm that
is used for selection of a spare to replace a failed component in the active
set can be used without change. Only the five processor case will oe
considered in this paper.
The addition of an extra spare in the architecture will increase the
number of fault classes in the system state aggregation categories. The
reasons for the increases have already been discussed.
Figure 6-5 shows the set of impossible states that would be good states
if the single fault arrival assumption were not applied to the active core
components. This set of impossible fault classes cannot occur because the
system will reconfigure to an improved fault condition for the active core
by use of the recovery algorithm described in section A of this chapter.
The set of possible good states is shown in Figure 6-6. Numbers are used
to label the state aggregations for the five processor case because the
increase in system complexity makes the use of letters inconvenient.
A semi-Markov model can be constructed using the set of state-
aggregations in Figure 6-6. This model is shown in Figure 6-7. Because the
model for the five processor case is more complex than for the three or four
processor cases, the representation of the model requires more room to
show all of the aggregation states and transitions. Therefore, Figure 6-7 is
spread over several pages. The states in the mode! refer to those shown in
Figure 6-6.
In several cases, the position of the fault in a single fault class changes
the state to which recovery is possible, as has been previously discussed.
The five processor case contains quite a few more states than for the four
processor case. In one case the state aggregation was split into two
seperate states (50 and 51 ) in order to more clearly show the differences in
recovery possibilities.
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VII. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. RESULTS
The results of applying the SURE Semi-Markov analysis program to the
reliability models developed in Chapters V and VI are shown in Figure 7-1.
The scale used for the probability of system failure axis is logarithmic so
that the results of each of the three models can be shown in the same
figure. The graph was constructed by plotting 15 equidistant points for
each model, varying the mission time from 1 to 15 hours. Cubic spline
interpolation was used to estimate the shape of the curve.
sir architecture:
time vs system failure probability













Figure 7-1 Reliability Modal Results
26
The graphs in the figure show the improvement in reliability achieved by
the addition of spares to the basic three processor case of the SIR
architecture. The mission time that is required by the FAA for reliability
calculations is 10 hours. Only the 5 processor case meets the FAA
requirement for a 10"9 probability of system catastrophic failure for the
10 hour mission time. (The exact numbers produced by the SURE program
place the bounds on the failure rate to within 3.07550 x 10"' and 3.13041 x
10"9 )
The model that is developed in this paper can be extended to cases of the
SIR architecture that use more than 2 spares. The algorithm that searchs
for an appropriate spare (discussed in Chapter V) still applies for the case
of the six processor architecture. As the number of spares increase
however, there are two factors that combine to limit the increase in
reliability that can be achieved by the addition of more spares. The first
factor is the increased time required to exhaustively search the system for
an optimum configuration for a given set of faults. The reason that the
search time becomes critical stims from the topological richness of the
node interconnections for the SIR architecture, and the fact that only two
processors are active in the search for a third good processor (and the links
connecting it with the two active processors). The two active processors
that comprise the active core for the search can be circulated through the
set of nodes until a good spare is found that has links to both the active
nodes The circulating process is performed by deactivating one of the
nodes in the original set of two, substituting the newly activated spare in
its place, and proceding in the search with the new set of two search nodes.
This requires a complete communication of the system state to the newly
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activated node prior to deactivation the node. selected for elimination from
the active core. The newly activated node must also be tested to establish
that it is fault free prior to deactivating the node in the original set of two.
At some point, the time limit of the control problem will require that the
search be stopped. Although the search process could be continued at the
conclusion of the next control cycle, the introduction of the extra time
invalidates the single fault arrival and reconfiguration assumption that has
been made for the models developed in this paper. The model would then
require a larger number of states, in fact the number of additional states
required would be the states listed as good but impossible by the single
fault arrival and reconfiguration assumption.
A second reason that increasing the number of spares fails to improve
the reliability is that the complexity of the link components increases as
nodes are added to the system. The models developed in this paper all used
a standard link circuit that supports a 6 node system. There should'actually
be some improvement in the numbers that are used in the 3 and four
processor cases (the 5 procesor case remains unchanged because the number
of flip flops required does not change). For systems larger than 6 nodes, a
extra flip flops and AMD gates are required at each end of the link. This
will increase the failure rate of the link component although the rate will
still be less than that of the node. (The node failure rate is changed by the
addition of 2 AND gates for each additional node to the system.)
It should be noted thai: the reliability models that are developed in this
paper are based on a visual analysis of a semi-Markov state representation
of the arrival of faults and recovery transitions in the SIR system. The
model becomes very complex as spares are added to the system. A
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conjecture was made in Chapter VII that signifacantly reduces the number
of states that are necessary for the semi-Markov model to capture all
nonredundant state information. There was not enough time remaining to
completely prove the conjecture, but an assumption of its correctness
allowed a visual analysis of the five processor case of the SIR architecture
(2 spares). Without use of this conjecture, the number of states necessary
in order to completely specify all state information would make a visual
analysis unworkable.
The conversion of the SURE program code to operate on the IBM PC- AT
was not completed in time for use in this paper. The calculations
graphically displayed in Figure 7-1 were performed with a version of SURE
that runs on a VAX 1 1/780 minicomputer under the VMS operating system.
The graphics package of the system is not operable at NPS so the numbers
that were produced by SURE for the three SIR reliability models were
plotted using DI55PLA, a collection of Fortran plotting routines installed on
the IBM 3033 mainframe computer resident at NPS.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The conjecture presented in Chapter VII should be proven, f he formal
statement of the conjecture made in Chapter VII should be of assistance in
the proof. The state aggregations that are possible by use of the conjecture
still results in a reliability model that grows exponentially in complexity
as spares are added to the SIR system. Visual analysis would be of limit
benefit for systems containing more than 2 spares. A computer algorithm
should be constructed to automate the analysis procedures that are
graphically displayed for the five processor case of the SIR architecture.
?Q
Such an automated system for applying the results of the conjecture would,
in conjunction with the SURE semi-Markov analysis program, provide a very
powerful 1 tool for the analysis of very complex systems.
There are several changes that can be made to the architecture of the SIR
system that could improve the system failure rates predicted by the model
presented in this paper. Contributions to component reliabilities made by
component subsystems indicate that a prime target for improvement is the
memory that is used in the node's computer. The failure rate of this
subsystem is an order of magnitude higher than for the remaining node
components. The use of such techniques as Hamming codes in the memory
element should be investigated. This technique of course requires that more
bits be included in the memory word which leads to greater complexity for
the memory. The Hamming codes allow a particular memory word to
operated acceptably after the arrival of a fault to the circuitry that
contains that word. This means that the memory is fault tolerant for a
whole class of faults (1 fault per word for a Hamming code that detects 2
faults and corrects 1 fault). There are obviously trades offs that have to be
analyzed.
Another place where the node could be changed is in the design of the
interface between the SIR node's microprocessor and the node's interstage.
The custom slave processor mode of operation was selected to control the
interstage and the communications protocol operating between the
microprocessor and the interstage This required a relatively complex
controller element for decoding the commands sent by the microprocessor.
The ROM used in the designed interstage controller contributed significantly
to the failure rate of the interstage subcomponent of the SIR node. A
;o
peripheral interface between the microprocessor and the interstage should
be explored as a possible reduction of required complexity in the interstage
controller.
Finally, gains could also be made in the manner in which the intemode
communications are performed in the SIR network. The design using
seperate clocks and a 5 register interstage could be reduced by a more
elaborate protocol between the nodes. A system of flags could be managed
in software resident in the host microprocessor and the SIR nodes
interprocessor communication could share the microprocessor ports that
are reserved exclusively for external communication in the present design
These approaches would result in a slower exchange of information between
the SIR nodes, but the decrease in hardware complexity may result in
increased reliability for the system. (Changes in the SIR node
intercommunication hardware could require a modification to the model
developed in this paper.)
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